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We investigate the effect of a change in the sex ratio on assortative matching in the 
marriage market using a large negative exogenous shock to the French male population due 
to WWI casualties. We analyze a novel data set that links marriage-level data to both 
French censuses of population and regional data on military mortality. We instrument the 
potentially endogenous sex ratio with military mortality, which exhibits exogenous 
geographic variation. We find that men married women of higher social class than 
themselves (married up) more in regions that experienced a larger decrease in the sex ratio 
due to higher military mortality. A decrease in the sex ratio from one man for every woman 
to 0.90 men for every woman increased the probability that men married up by 8.2 
percentage points. These findings shed light on individuals’ preferences for spouses. Rather 
than preferring to marry spouses with similar characteristics, individuals seem to prefer to 
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I. Introduction 
Positive assortative matching in the marriage market by spouses’ characteristics such as 
income, education, occupation, age, religion, and ethnicity is a well-known and widespread 
phenomenon (e.g., Hout 1982, Mare 1991, Kalmijn 1998, Blossfeld and Timm 2003).
1 Moreover, the 
tendency of individuals to marry others with similar traits has important implications for social 
inequality, income redistribution, fertility, education, and labor supply (e.g., Fernandez and Rogerson 
2001). However, there is still little understanding about what generates this assortative matching. One 
possibility is that individuals have horizontal preferences. That is, they may choose spouses who share 
similar characteristics simply because they derive more utility from marrying people like themselves.
2 
Alternatively, individuals may have vertical preferences, meaning they prefer to marry “up,” i.e. to 
marry someone exhibiting better characteristics (such as higher income or higher education), but 
cannot, because they do not receive marriage proposals from such people.
3 Finally, individuals may 
have the opportunity to meet only people who share their characteristics. We use unique data on a 
negative exogenous shock to the male population to investigate which of these preferences and 
constraints are responsible for assortative matching, or marriage by “class.”   
  Identifying which of the above mechanisms underlies the equilibrium matching outcomes in the 
marriage market is challenging: they all generate observationally equivalent outcomes, i.e. assortative 
matching whereby people marry by “class.” Our identification strategy relies on the fact that under 
different preferences an exogenous change in the sex ratio has a different impact on equilibrium 
marriage outcomes. Specifically, if individuals marry by class because they intrinsically prefer a 
spouse with similar characteristics, or because they only meet potential partners with the same 
background, an exogenous decrease in the proportion of men in the population would have a limited 
effect on the assortative matching: men would continue to marry women of the same class. If instead 
individuals prefer spouses of higher class than themselves, the same decrease in the proportion of men 
would improve the position of men in the marriage market and eventually enable them to marry 
women from higher classes who were previously inaccessible.  
  We exploit the regrettable fact that World War I (WWI), one of the deadliest conflicts in recent 
human history, produced an exogenous and unusually large shock in the French male population. 
                                                 
1 See Pencavel (1998) and Rose (2001) for trends in assortative matching in the U.S.  
2 Aristotle noted that people “love those who are like themselves” (Aristotle 1934, p. 1371). Sociologists believe that “the 
homophily principle structures network ties of every type, including marriage, friendship, work, advice, support, 
information transfer, exchange, comembership, and other types of relationship” (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 
2001).  
3 See, for example, Burdett and Coles (1997).    2
Approximately 16.5% of French soldiers were reported dead or missing after the war (Huber, 1931). 
The First World War in France provides an ideal setting to test the effect of the sex ratio on marriage 
by social class for the following reasons. First, the ratio of men aged 18 to 59 to women aged 15 to 49 
decreased from 1,087 men per 1,000 women in 1911 to 992 men per 1,000 women in 1921 in an 
exogenous way as a result of the military mortality.
4 Second, military mortality varied substantially 
across regions, ranging from 5% to 23% of men aged 18 to 59 (see Figure 1.1), largely because of 
different regiment call-ups. This variation generated substantial heterogeneity in sex ratios across 
regions, reaching 864 men per 1,000 women in some regions, allowing us to precisely evaluate the 
impact of the sex ratio on assortative matching. Finally, unlike in many other wars, military mortality 
was uniform across occupations, which we use to define social class, implying that the distribution of 
social classes in the population remained essentially unchanged by the war (see Table 1.1). This fact 
rules out the hypothesis that changes in marriage by class following the war were mechanically driven 
by changes in the distributions of classes.  
We analyze the impact of this massive decrease in the male population on marriage by social 
class in France using a new data set which links marriage-level data to both French censuses of 
population and regional data on military mortality. Classes are assigned to individuals using marriage 
certificate data that provide information on the occupations of the brides, grooms, and their parents, as 
well as the place and date of each marriage. Based on either the occupations of the bride and groom or 
the occupations of their fathers, we allocate individuals into seven ordered social classes using the 
Historical International Social Class Scheme (HISCLASS) developed by van Leeuwen and Maas 
(2005a). These social classes, based on dimensions such as the degree of supervision required to 
perform the job, the skill level required, whether the job is manual or not, and the economic sector, 
were carefully constructed to categorize individuals according to their life chances. There was 
considerable assortative matching by social class before WWI: 43% of men married women of the 
same social class, and the distance between the social classes of spouses was 1 or less for 68% of 
couples. Based on the locations of the marriages, we link the marriage-level data with the French 
censuses of 1911, 1921 and 1926.  These contain region-level information that allows us to construct 
the sex ratio for all the French départements (regional unit), as well as other département-level control 
variables.
5 We also use military mortality data from the French ministry of defense to compute, for 
                                                 
4 Since this war was fought in the battlefield, civilian mortality (which is more balanced across genders) was lower than in 
later major wars such as the Second World War. 
5 Departments are administrative units similar to counties. In 1870-1914, France had 87 départements. After WWI, the 
number increased to 90 because territories from Alsace-Lorraine lost in the 1870s were recovered.    3
each département, the military mortality rate corresponding to the number of dead soldiers as the 
percentage of the pre-war male population. 
          We use two empirical strategies to analyze the effect of a change in the sex ratio. First, we 
compare the distribution of brides’ classes for each class of groom before and after the war. Second, 
we exploit the exogenous regional variation in sex ratio due to war mortality to investigate more 
directly the relationship between sex ratio and marriage outcomes. We use three alternative dependent 
variables to capture whether and to what degree men married women of higher classes (i.e., married 
up), namely (i) the difference between the social class of the bride and that of the groom; (ii) a dummy 
for whether the groom married a bride of higher class than his; and (iii) a dummy for whether the 
groom married a bride of low social class, meaning a bride in one of the three lowest classes according 
to HISCLASS classification. As alternative independent variables of interest we use département-
specific sex ratios and mortality rates. We also use mortality rates as an instrument for sex ratio, which 
may be endogenous because of the possible selection of internal migrants. 
We include département fixed effects to control for permanent differences between French 
départements, and also include a time trend. The analysis also controls for other marriage-level 
characteristics that might affect assortative matching such as the groom’s class, the spouses’ ages, and 
whether the marriage took place in a rural area. In addition, we control for the contemporaneous 
distribution of women’s occupations to account for possible changes in the labor force due to the war, 
as well as for the excess of foreign men over foreign women, to account for the possibility that foreign 
men (mainly Italians) migrated to France after the war and competed with French men for local brides. 
Overall, we find that the decrease in sex ratio caused by war-related mortality allowed men to 
marry higher class women. Specifically, a decrease in the (instrumented) sex ratio from one man for 
every woman to 0.90 men for every woman corresponds to (i) an increase in the average class of bride 
for a given class of groom of 0.27, meaning for instance that if class 4 men married on average class 4 
women when the sex ratio was even, they would marry on average class 3.73 women under a 0.90-to-1 
sex ratio; (ii) an increase in the probability that men would marry women of (weakly) higher class than 
themselves of 8.2 percentage points; and (iii) a decrease in the probability that a given groom would 
marry a low class bride of 18.5 percentage points. As a robustness check, we test whether the effect of 
sex ratio on assortative matching is different in rural locations, where search frictions, meeting 
technology and preferences might be different compared with urban locations. We find a similar effect 
of sex ratio in rural and urban areas.  
We view these findings as evidence that on average individuals prefer higher-class partners. This 
favors the hypothesis that assortative matching occurs because in equilibrium individuals cannot marry    4
higher-class people, although they may wish to do so. In addition, we find heterogeneity in the effect 
of the sex ratio by groom’s class, with men of the lowest classes, namely low-skilled and unskilled 
farm workers, benefiting the least from the sex ratio imbalance. A possible explanation is that while 
high and middle-class women were willing to marry men from lower social classes, they were not 
willing to accept proposals from men of very low social class.   
While the main focus of this paper is assortative matching by social class, there are clearly 
other dimensions of “attractiveness” individuals consider when choosing a spouse. Our data allow us 
to study assortative matching by another important such dimension, namely age. Specifically, we 
investigate whether the decrease in sex ratio due to war mortality changed the spousal age gap. We 
employ the same empirical strategies described above, and find a higher decrease in the age gap 
between grooms and brides in départements with higher mortality. Given that grooms are, on average, 
older than their brides, these results are consistent with men preferring women who are closer to their 
own age.  
Starting with the seminal work of Becker (1973, 1974), economists have devoted considerable 
attention to understanding marriage markets.
6 In particular, an important issue in the empirical 
literature of the marriage market has been the characterization of individuals’ preferences for spouses. 
This characterization is difficult because equilibrium outcomes in the marriage markets are not only 
determined by preferences, but also by the mechanisms that match men and women. One strand of the 
literature deals with the identification problem by performing structural estimations of marriage 
models using marriage outcomes data (e.g., Wong 2003, Bisin et al. 2004, Choo and Siow 2006). In a 
second strand of the literature based on speed and online dating data (e.g., Ariely, Hitsch and Hortacsu 
2006, Belot and Francesconi 2006, Fisman et al. 2006, Lee 2007), the identification issue is overcome 
by the fact that individuals’ dating decisions (rather than just final outcomes) are observed in 
environments where the matching mechanism is controlled. This paper too characterizes individuals’ 
preferences for spouses.  Our identification strategy relies on the fact that different preferences for 
spouses imply a change in the sex ratio has different effects on assortative matching. 
This paper is also related to the empirical literature on the relationship between the sex ratio 
and the marriage market (e.g., Cox 1940, Easterlin 1961, Guttentag and Secord, 1983). A potential 
problem of these studies, mitigated to a large extent in Angrist (2002), Charles and Luoh (2005), 
Brainerd (2007), and Lafortune (2008) is that there may be reverse causality between sex ratios and 
                                                 
6 For a review of the economics of marriages, see Weiss (1993).    5
marriage market outcomes.
7 The exogenous geographic variation of sex ratio due to the war mortality 
also allows us to overcome this problem. We add to these papers by focusing on the effect of the 
change in sex ratio on assortative matching.  
By looking at the impact of a change in the sex ratio on marriage outcomes, this paper sheds 
light on possible adjustments in the marriage market induced by a change in the relative scarcity of 
men or women. Rao (1993), Grossbard-Shechtman (1993), Botticini (1999, 2003) and Edlund (2000) 
suggest that one adjustment is through dowries. Becker (1974, 1981), Bergstrom (1994), Willis (1999), 
Neal (2004), among others, suggest that a consequence of the imbalance in sex ratio is the emergence 
of polygamy, including “serial polygamy” (divorce and re-marriage) and relationships leading to out-
of-wedlock births. Becker (1973, 1981), Chiappori et al. (2001) and references therein point out that a 
possible adjustment is a change in the share appropriated by each spouse of the surplus generated by 
marriage. In this paper, we highlight marrying above one’s own class as another possible and 
potentially complementary adjustment when the scarcity of men increases. The social ascension of 
men in post-WWI France that we document enhances our understanding of the economic and social 
history of France after the Great War. Unbalanced sex ratios are, however, far from being limited to 
the past. Our paper suggests that we may observe social ascension of women in countries like China 
and India, where there are disproportionately many men relative to the number of women in the 
marriage market. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the historical context surrounding 
WWI in France. In Section 3 we present the theoretical framework that motivates our empirical 
analysis of marriage by social class. The data are described in Section 4. In Sections 5 and 6 we 
present the empirical strategy and main results. Section 7 describes the results of assortative matching 
by age.  
 
2. Historical Context 
WWI, or the Great War, was a global and deadly military conflict that lasted from July 1914 until 
November 1918. In this section, we present a brief description of the war-related mortality and its 
implications for marriage and celibacy rates in France. 
 
2.1  Mobilization and mortality during WWI in France: a global phenomenon 
                                                 
7 Brainerd (2007) is a related study written in parallel to ours examining the impact of the unbalanced sex ratio on marriage 
rates and fertility in post WWII Russia.    6
Throughout the war, France undertook a universal mobilization. Over the war period, about 8 
million Frenchmen born between 1867 and 1899 were drafted or voluntarily enrolled in the army 
(Huber, 1931).
8 To highlight the scope of this mobilization, note that 8.8 million men aged 18 to 51 
were registered in the 1911 census, and that the overall French population in 1911 was approximately 
33.2 million. Younger cohorts were more heavily drafted than older cohorts: more than 90% of men 
born between 1894 and 1896, 80% of those born between 1876 and 1896 and about 60% of the older 
cohorts were drafted in the army. Exemptions were extremely rare. During the war, the French army 
reviewed all exempt cases and drafted a large proportion of men who were initially exempted, 
including those who had been injured early in the war.  
As a result of this general mobilization and the violence of the conflict, military casualties were 
enormous. 1.397 million men, or 16.5% of the enrolled soldiers and officers, were reported dead or 
missing in action at the end of the war. Military mortality was quite homogenous across military ranks: 
about 16% of French soldiers and 19% of French officers died or were reported missing. Similarly, 
mortality across occupations seems to have been quite uniform. Table 2.1 presents the distribution of 
fatalities by occupations at age 20 while Table 1.1 shows the distribution of the labor force by 
economic sectors from the 1906 and 1921 censuses.
9 Although the occupation categories differ slightly 
between the two tables, the distribution of fatalities by occupations is very similar to that of men in the 
labor force. For example, 41.5% of the casualties worked in agriculture at age 20 while the 1906 
census shows that 43% of men in the labor force were hired in the agricultural sector. Similar striking 
comparisons can be made with sales, industry and liberal professions.
10 Moreover, the comparison 
between the 1906 and 1921 censuses in Table 1.1 shows that there were only minor changes in the 
distribution by sector during that period. The most notable facts are the increases in the proportion of 
men working in the industrial sectors and of individuals in the labor force. Women’s occupations were 
also little affected by the war. Between 80 and 95% of the women who replaced men in the 
metalworking industry during the war were already working before the war, most often in textiles, 
clothing or services (Downs, 1995). Furthermore, these women were sent back home or to their old 
occupations at the end of the war, leaving female occupations largely unchanged (Becker, 1999).  
                                                 
8 About 7.8 million men were drafted and 0.2 million enrolled voluntarily. In addition, 0.5 million foreigners and men from 
the French colonies joined the French army. Note that all the numbers presented in this subsection are taken from Huber 
(1931) unless otherwise noted. 
9 Mortality data on soldiers’ occupations when drafted are not available.  Data on occupation at age 20 were recorded 
during each individual’s military service. 
10 Anecdotal evidence also stresses that many elites and white collar workers perished during the conflict. 450 writers from 
the “Societe des gens de letters”, a writers’ organization, 833 former students of the Ecole Polytechnique and 230 from the 
Ecole Normale, both of which were prestigious universities, were killed during the conflict.    7
Although mortality was uniform across military rank and occupations, there was some 
heterogeneity in mortality rates by age and geographical region. Younger men were more likely to die. 
Men born between 1892 and 1895 were the most affected (27 to 29% of them died), while men born 
between 1883 and 1891 experienced mortality rates from 19.2% to 24.1%. Older cohorts of men aged 
40 and above at the beginning of the war suffered from the lowest mortality rates (10% or less). Across 
geographical regions, mortality rates ranged from 5% in the département of Alpes-Maritime to 23% in 
the département of Lozère.  
In addition to military casualties, deaths among civilians amounted to 3.7 million during the period 
1914 to 1918, with the peak of mortality being caused by the 1918 Spanish flu epidemic.
11 This total 
number of deaths is equivalent to an average of 623 thousand deaths per year over the years 1914 to 
1919, which can be compared with 587.4 thousand deaths in total in 1913. We can similarly evaluate 
the impact of the war on civilian deaths by comparing the number of deaths per 10,000 inhabitants, 
which increased from 179 in 1913 to 215 during the war.
12 Among the civilian population, the 
mortality rate was higher for men than women (256 versus 186 per 10,000), and the increase in 
mortality rate was the most striking for men aged 15 to 45.  
 
2.2   Marriage market in France 
The 19
th century and the beginning of the 20
th century were characterized by a stable celibacy rate 
of 10% to 13.5%, and a high marriage rate (Dupaquier, 1988). The marriage rate, which measures the 
number of new spouses per 10,000 inhabitants, was approximately 150 at the end of the 19
th century.  
In 1907, it reached 160, which may have been the result of a new law simplifying the formalities 
associated with getting married. The average marriage rate of the 1908 to 1913 period was 158, which 
puts France at a high rank among European nations.
13  
After the onset of the war, the total number of marriages diminished sharply, reaching its lowest 
value in 1915 (75,200 marriages compared with 247,900 in 1913). After 1915, the marriage rate started 
to increase again, though at a slow pace, as a system of regular permissions took place. By 1919, the 
marriage rate exceeded its 1913 value. More than 2 million marriages took place in the 4 years 
following the end of the war (Armangaud, 1965). While the marriage rate increased everywhere after 
the war, there was heterogeneity by regions, with higher marriage rates on the Atlantic coast and in the 
industrial regions of Paris and Northern France (Huber, 1931).  
                                                 
11 About 130,000 Frenchmen died from the Spanish flu (Becker, 1999). 
12 The death rate for the war refers to the years 1915-1918. 
13 Only oriental Europe and the Balkans experienced higher rates (Dupaquier, 1988).    8
Figure 2.1 shows the total number of first marriages for women by cohort for the period 1900 to 
1950 and highlights how the war disturbed women’s marriage patterns. For women born in 1891 to 
1895, the distribution of marriages is literally cut in half with a first part of the distribution before the 
conflict and the second part concentrated in a few years after the war. To some extent, the cohort 1886-
1890 experienced a similar effect. For women born in 1896-1900, the distribution of marriages is 
characterized by a large and narrow peak after the war.    
In addition to the change of the timing of marriages due to the war, the marriage market was deeply 
affected by the sharp drop in the male population. The war mortality changed the sex ratio 
dramatically: while there were 997 men for every 1,000 women in 1911, the ratio became 909 for 
1,000 in 1921 (Huber, 1931). If we restrict to the population of marriageable age (18 to 59 years old 
for men and 15 to 49 years old for women
14), the sex ratio decreased from 1,087 men per 1,000 women 
in 1911 to 992 men per 1,000 women in 1921, reaching 864 in some regions with high mortality 
rates.
15 If we focus on singles, widows and divorcees who were 30 or less but of marriageable age, 
there were approximately 2 men for every 3 women (Huber, 1931).  
As a consequence of the imbalance in the sex ratio, many women remained single in the post-war 
period. Figure 2.2 emphasizes the huge increase in female celibacy rates as measured by the percentage 
of singles at age 50. In particular, women were more likely to remain single after the war in 
départements with high mortality rates.
16  
Similarly, Figure 2.2 shows a large decrease in male celibacy rates among the individuals in 
cohorts affected by the war. This suggests that, to compensate for the shortage of men, some men who 
would otherwise have remained single got married. Henry (1966) emphasizes two other mechanisms of 
compensation: an increase of marriages to foreigners, and a change in the age gap between spouses 
with men getting married to older women. In Section 7, we explore the effect of the unbalanced sex 
ratio on the change in age gap.  
While in the 19
th century marriage was the norm, divorce was a rare phenomenon. In the periods 
immediately before and after WWI, divorce rates remained low: 4 divorces per 100 new marriages in 
1913 and 6 divorces per 100 new marriages in 1925 (Segalen, 1981).  
                                                 
14 15 and 18 years old are the legal ages for getting married for women and men respectively. 
15 Authors’ calculation from French census data. 
16 Table 2.2 presents the results of regressions of the percentage of single women on mortality (or sex ratio) using census 
data (see Section 4) and shows that more women remained single in departments with higher mortality rates. We classify as 
single all women who have never been married, are widowed, or are divorced.    9
Assortative matching according to social class and geographic location was prevalent in the 
beginning of the 20
th century (Segalen, 1981).
17 Based on a survey conducted on a sample of couples 
who married between 1914 and 1959, Girard (1974) finds that, despite the growth of urban 
agglomerations, higher geographic mobility, and more frequent occasions of meeting people of the 
other sex, there is clear assortative matching between husbands and wives according to proximity of 
residence, age, social classes and height.
18 
Girard (1974) also provides detailed information about spouses’ meeting. For the period 1914-
1930, the most common place was in their neighborhood (21%), followed by meeting at friends’ places 
(17%, including 10% of “arranged meetings”), at work (16%) and at a ball (13%). There was some 
heterogeneity across the husband’s occupation. Managers, employees, skilled workers and farmers 
were more likely to meet their spouse in their neighborhood, while unskilled workers, salesmen and 
craftsmen were more likely to meet their spouse at a ball (Bozon and Heran, 1987).  
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
    A robust prediction of marriage models is that the position of men in the marriage market 
improves with a reduction in the sex ratio. Depending on preferences, men could marry up or they 
could improve their bargaining position inside the marriage even if they continue to marry the same 
class women. In the framework suggested by Burdett and Coles (1997) and Bloch and Ryder (2000), 
individuals prefer to marry up, and a decrease in the sex ratio allows men to do so. Other marriage 
models suggest other adjustments of the marriage markets as responses to a relative scarcity of men, 
and do not necessarily imply that men would marry higher class women. In Becker's (1973, 1974 and 
1981) frictionless model of the marriage market, an increase in men’s scarcity induces a decrease in the 
supply of men in the marriage market, implying that men appropriate more of the surplus generated by 
their marriage. More recently, Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2001) presented a model of household 
bargaining and the distribution of resources inside the family. In their model, a reduction in the sex 
                                                 
17 In the 19
th century, marriage was an opportunity for farmers to maintain or increase the land owned by the family, and 
therefore had to be approved by the parents. Among rural craftsmen, assortative matching by occupation was frequent 
because husbands and wives had complementary skills for family production. Urban workers were financially independent 
from their parents, which allowed them not only to marry younger, but also without their parents’ intervention. Among the 
urban “bourgeois,” marriage was a way to potentially move up in society, and was therefore controlled by the parents. 
Compared with other social classes, their marriages were more likely to be arranged by relatives (Segalen, 1981). 
18 In addition, 68% of the interviewed people report that it is better for spouses to be from the same social background. 
When asked which advice they would give to their children, 44% would advise them to choose a spouse from the same 
“milieu” while 8% who would advise them to take into account feelings.    10
ratio increases men's bargaining power within the household and in the marriage market.
19 
Unfortunately, we do not have information on relative bargaining power within the household, so we 
cannot test this important implication of these theories. 
In this section, we consider the impact of a change in the sex ratio on marriage by class under 
different assumptions about individuals’ preferences for characteristics in a spouse and the constraints 
they face in the marriage market. For concreteness, we focus on a sudden decrease in the sex ratio 
when initially the number of men and women in the population is balanced. Consider first the cases in 
which (i) individuals prefer partners with similar characteristics to themselves, i.e., men and women 
prefer to marry within class (horizontal preferences) and (ii) individuals only meet partners from the 
same class. In both cases, the analysis of the impact of a change in the sex ratio on marriage by class is 
straightforward. Men continue to marry women of their own class. The difference relative to the initial 
situation is that now a fraction of women in each class remains single. 
     A natural framework to analyze the effect of changes in the sex ratio on marriage behavior 
when individuals prefer to marry up rather than within class is that of Burdett and Coles (1997) and 
Bloch and Ryder (2000) who apply to the marriage market the matching framework pioneered by 
Mortensen (1982), Diamond (1982) and Pissarides (1990). Burdett and Coles (1997) and Bloch and 
Ryder (2000) consider a marriage market with search frictions and heterogeneous agents. Each 
individual, man or woman, is characterized by a real number; this number corresponds to an 
attractiveness index that measures how attractive the individual is to potential partners. If a man and a 
woman marry, the woman's gain from the marriage equals the man's index and man's gain from the 
marriage equals the woman's index. So, individuals gain more by marrying higher-index individuals. A 
crucial aspect of the model is that singles in the market meet singles of the opposite sex only every 
now and then − the search friction. When two singles meet, they observe each other's attractiveness 
index and decide whether to propose or not. A marriage occurs if both singles propose. If at least one 
of the singles does not propose, they separate and continue searching for another partner. Search costs 
are embodied in a discount factor that captures individuals’ impatience to get married. A single's 
decision to propose given contact with a potential partner depends on (i) the partner's index, (ii) the 
rate at which the single meets other singles of the opposite sex, and (iii) the single’s expectation about 
who will propose to her (or him) upon contact. 
             In this marriage market, proposing today as opposed to waiting introduces a tradeoff. Waiting 
allows the possibility of a higher index match, but is costly since individuals discount the future. 
                                                 
19 Iyigun and Walsh (2007) provide a model in which asymmetries in the sex ratios in the marriage markets produce gender 
differences in premarital investments and consumption.    11
Classes emerge endogenously in equilibrium. Singles partition themselves into classes according to 
their index levels. To illustrate why this is the case, suppose that the attractiveness indices of men and 
women lie in the interval [0,1]. Consider now the problem faced by a man with the highest index. 
Every woman proposes to this man, thus he faces an unconstrained search problem. Consequently, his 
optimal strategy is a threshold strategy, i.e., to propose to women whose indices are above a given 
value, and not propose to other women. Let w1<1 denote this threshold value. A consequence of this 
behavior on the men's side is that women with index in (w1,1] are accepted by the highest-quality men 
and therefore by every type of men. Thus, all women in (w1,1] face the same unconstrained search 
problem. As such, their optimal strategy is to accept men with indexes above a certain threshold value 
and reject all others. Let m1 denote that threshold. Men with indices in (m1,1] form a class − they are 
the men of class one; and women with indices in (w1,1] also form a class--they are the women of class 
one. In equilibrium, men of class 1 only marry women of class 1, and vice versa. Consider now the 
highest-index woman w1 and the highest-index man m1 who remains on the market. Woman w1 is 
accepted by any man in [0, m1] and man m1 is accepted by any woman in [0, w1]. We can thus apply 
the same reasoning as above to obtain threshold values w2 and m2. Men with indices in (m2, m1] and 
women with indices in (w2, w1] form another class, class two. Again, women of class two only marry 
man of class two, and vice versa. Applying the same argument in a recursive way, we can obtain all the 
other classes. Therefore, in equilibrium there is assortative matching; men and women only marry 
individuals of the same class. In this model men and women would like to marry singles of higher 
classes, but they cannot. 
    We now analyze the impact of a sudden reduction in the male population on equilibrium marriage 
behavior using this framework. A reduction in the male population affects the marriage market by 
affecting the rate at which singles meet. Assuming that a reduction in the male population (while 
keeping the female population constant) reduces the total number of meetings between singles, one 
immediately obtains that the meeting rate for single women decreases. Since a reduction in the meeting 
rate reduces a woman's prospects of meeting potential partners in the future, her valuation of rejecting 
a man in a contact and remaining single decreases. Thus, women become less selective and are willing 
to accept men of lower quality. Formally, with a reduction in the male population, there is a re-
definition of the men's classes. Let m1, m2, m3..., mn denote the thresholds that initially define men's 
classes. A reduction in the male population implies a reduction in those thresholds. If that reduction is 
sufficiently severe, the number of classes of men may decrease.
20 If we additionally assume that with a 
                                                 
20 For a formal analysis of the impact of a change in the number of men on men's classes see Bloch and Ryder (2000).    12
reduction of the number of men the rate at which single men meet single women increases, then 
women’s classes also change. With a higher rate of meeting single women, a man's valuation of 
rejecting a woman in a given match and remaining single increases. As a consequence, men can afford 
to become more selective. Formally, this implies an increase in the thresholds w1, w2, w3...,wn  that 
define women’s classes. A consequence of a decrease in thresholds m1, m2, m3...,mn and/or an increase 
in thresholds w1, w2, w3...,wn is that men tend to marry higher-quality women. Putting it in terms of 
classes, and fixing classes as being those prior to the change in the sex ratio, this means that men of a 
given class now marry women of higher classes and women of a given class now marry men of lower 
classes than they did before the decrease in the male population. 
     
4. Data 
The data we use in this paper come from several sources. In this section, we present the various data 
sets. 
 
4.1. The TRA data set 
The TRA data set is the result of a survey, “l’enquête des 3,000 familles”, that collects data on 
the descendants of 3,000 couples who got married between 1803 and 1832 in metropolitan France. 
This project, undertaken by the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, aims at analyzing social 
and geographical mobility in France in the 19
th and 20
th centuries. Dupaquier (2004) presents in detail 
the sampling design and logistics of the data collection. We briefly summarize these below. 
The 3,000 families selected between 1803 and 1832 were representative of the French 
population at the time (one family per 10,000 inhabitants). Data on birth, marriage and death 
certificates were collected.
21 Geographical quotas were used to ensure geographical representativeness: 
the number of couples sampled per département was proportional to its population from the 1806 
census. Then, in each département, a random sample of couples was drawn among those whose name 
starts with the letters “TRA,” such as Trarieux, Trabit, etc… The letters TRA were chosen to allow 
names from various local dialects to be represented in the sample, as well as to ensure 
representativeness of all the social classes (Pélissier et al., 2005). The descendants of the TRA families 
and their spouses were followed until 1986. To avoid an exponential growth of the sample size through 
time, the descendants of women (who lost their TRA name upon marriage) are not included in the 
sample. Dupaquier (2004) points out two potential selections of the TRA data set. The aristocracy 
                                                 
21 A separate project, the “TRA patrimoine” has also been undertaken to collect data on the bequests left by the TRA 
families (see for example Bourdieu et al., 2004). However, we do not have access to those data.     13
might be under-represented, and foreign migrants who came after 1832 are not included in the 
sample.
22  
In this paper, we use data from marriage certificates from two periods around WWI: 1909-1914 
and 1918-1928.
23 Marriage certificates contain the following information: year and département of 
marriage, ages and occupations of both spouses, and occupations of their parents.
24 In addition, we 
know whether the marriage took place in a rural area. We have observations on 1,688 marriages before 
the war and 4,509 after it. We use the data on occupations to allocate brides and grooms to social 
classes. To do this, we first match each occupation present in our data set to a code from the Historical 
International Standard Classification of Occupations (HISCO). HISCO is a detailed coding system 
designed to facilitate the comparison of historical international data. It is based on the 1968 
International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO68), and customized for historical data (van 
Leeuwen et al., 2002). HISCO allocates each occupation to one of 7 sectors: (1) Professional, (2) 
Technical and Related Workers Administrative and Managerial Workers, (3) Clerical and Related 
Workers, (4) Sales Workers, (5) Service Workers, (6) Agricultural, Animal Husbandry and Forest 
Workers, Fishermen and Hunters and (7) Production and Related Workers, Transport Equipment 
Operators and Laborers. Each of these sectors is itself divided into smaller sub-sectors. For example, 
codes of the type 6-xx.xx correspond to the agricultural sector. Codes of the type 6-2x.xx refer to 
agricultural workers. This last group includes codes of the type 6-22.xx for field crop and vegetable 
farm workers and these, in turn, contain more specific occupational categories such as wheat farm 
workers (coded as 6-22.30) (van Leeuwen and Maas, 2005a). The HISCO classification contains about 
1,600 occupations characterized by 5-digit codes. We allocate to all the occupations in our data set a 5-
digit HISCO code using a mapping available on the History of Work Information System website 
(http://historyofwork.iisg.nl/).  
                                                 
22 Nobles may sometimes be classified under the letter D (because they are called “de Tra” rather than “Tra”). Some nobles 
might thus have escaped the original design. In addition, while the proportion of farmers is correct when considering the 
period over which the overall TRA data set was collected (i.e. 1803-1986), farmers seem to be over-represented in the 
resulting sample for the period 1970-1986. This may raise some selectivity issues. To deal with this, the descendants of 
3,000 additional “TRA” couples who married between 1803 and 1832 have been followed. The sample we use is based on 
the data set constructed with all of the 6,000 TRA families (source: email conversation with Jean-Pierre Pélissier).   
23 As we noted, women’s occupations remained similar pre and post war. While women replaced men in the war industry 
during the war period, they were sent back home or to their previous occupations right after the war (Becker, 1999). Yet, 
female labor force increased during the late 1920s and 1930s to compensate for the loss of men. As a robustness check, we 
therefore replicate our estimations using a shorter post-war period (from 1918-1923) in which women labor force 
participation was very similar to that of the pre-war period (see Appendix A). We find similar results with the two different 
cuts of the data. In addition, the war ended in November 1918 but in our data there are 220 marriages in that year, which are 
expected to be affected by the unbalanced sex ratio. The results are unchanged when we exclude marriages that took place 
in 1918. 
24 Occupations are missing for about 5% of the grooms and 12% of the brides, and for over 40% of their parents.    14
The HISCO classification refers to economic sectors, which do not necessarily correspond to 
homogenous “social” classes. To map occupations into social classes, we use the Historical 
International Social Class Scheme (HISCLASS) developed by van Leeuwen and Maas (van Leeuwen 
and Maas, 2005a). The HISCLASS system allocates all the HISCO occupations into 12 social classes, 
where a “social class” is defined by van Leeuwen and Maas (2005a) as “a set of persons with the same 
life chances.” The mapping of occupations into social class takes into account whether the occupation 
is manual, and if it requires special skills or involves supervision. To increase the sample size in each 
class, in this paper we use the version of HISCLASS condensed into the following 7 social classes: 
•  Class 1: Higher managers and professionals 
•  Class 2: Lower managers and professionals, clerical and sales personnel 
•  Class 3: Foremen and skilled workers 
•  Class 4: Farmers and fishermen 
•  Class 5: Lower-skilled workers 
•  Class 6: Unskilled workers 
•  Class 7: Lower-skilled and unskilled farm workers 
This 7-class classification has been used in other works, and in particular in works using the TRA data 
set, to study social mobility and endogamy (Pélissier et al. 2005, Holt 2005, Bull 2005, Schumacher 
and Lorenzetti 2005, Arrizabalaga 2005, Lanzinger 2005, Dribe and Christer Lundh 2005, Van de 
Putte et al. 2005, Bras and Kok 2005, van Leeuwen and Maas, 2005b, 2005c). 
Our main definition of social class is based on brides’ and grooms’ own occupations. There are, 
however, a few potential issues with using own occupations as a measure of social class to compare 
assortative matching before and after the war. First, the unbalanced sex ratio could potentially induce 
individuals to change their occupations. This does not seem to have occurred in the short period 
analyzed in this paper, as the occupation distribution of men and women in the labor force changed 
very little after the war. Furthermore, in our analysis of the impact of the sex ratio on assortative 
matching, we control for the distributions of women’s occupations in each department to account for 
department-specific potential changes in women’s labor force opportunities. Second, the unbalanced 
sex ratio may change age at marriage, which in turn may affect occupation at marriage. To address this 
potential issue, we control for the ages of brides and grooms which allows us to capture the effect of 
the sex ratio on social class that goes beyond its effect on age. In Section 7.3, we examine the effect of 
the sex ratio on spousal age gap.     15
Another important issue when using own occupation as a measure of class is how to assign 
class for brides without occupations, who account for 35-40% of all brides (see Table 4.1). Brides 
without occupations might either be of low social class (if they have low skills and status) or of high 
social class (if they have high status and do not need to work). We start by excluding brides without 
occupations from the analysis. Then, in Section 6.3.5, we impute class for brides without occupations 
using two alternative approaches. The first is to impute the class of brides without occupations with 
their fathers’ classes. The idea is that men perceive a woman without an occupation as having her 
father’s class. However, father’s class is missing for almost half of our sample and may not be missing 
at random. Thus, our second approach is to impute class for brides without occupations and brides with 
missing occupations by using the predicted class obtained from an OLS regression of bride’s class on 
marriage-level and individual-level information. We show in Appendix H that the results are similar 
when imputing bride’s class using the two approaches described. 
We also use an alternative way to define social class, namely based on brides’ fathers’ and 
grooms’ fathers’ occupations. For some brides and grooms to be, the occupations of their fathers may 
have been more important than their own occupations, while others might have cared more about the 
characteristics of their future spouse than about the characteristics of his or her father. Moreover, a 
main advantage of father’s class is that it is pre-determined and not likely to respond to the marriage 
market conditions and to the change in the sex ratio. A disadvantage of using fathers’ social classes is 
that fathers’ classes are missing for almost half of the observations so the remaining sample is small. In 
Appendix B, we show that results are similar when fathers’ social classes are used instead of own 
classes, but the results are weaker and less statistically significant in some specifications.  
In Table 4.1, we present the distribution of brides, grooms and their fathers when classified 
according to the above 7 social classes (class 1 being the highest, and class 7 being the lowest). Classes 
2 to 5 are the most numerous, and there are very few brides of the highest and the lowest classes 
(classes 1 and 7).  
 
4.2 The French censuses 
The French census data for the years 1906, 1911 and 1921 are available from Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research (2007). The 1926 census data are available from archives 
at the library of the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). We link the year 
and département of each marriage in the TRA data set to département-level information available from 
the censuses. In particular, we construct for these three years the sex ratio in each département, which    16
we define as the ratio of the number of males aged 18 to 59 to the number of females aged 15 to 49. 
The average sex ratio is 1.12 in 1911 and 1.02 in 1921, when it ranges from 0.86 to 1.23. 
We also construct indicators of women’s occupations to capture the distribution of social class 
of potential brides faced by grooms (when using own occupations to define social class), and the 
distribution of men’s occupations to capture the distribution of social class of potential brides’ fathers 
faced by grooms’ fathers (when using fathers’ occupations to define social class).
25 Specifically, the 
proportion of females and males who are: (i) managers, (ii) employees, (iii) workers, (iv) self-
employed and (v) unemployed.
26 To account for the role of foreigners in the marriage market (see 
Section 2 and Henry, 1966), we construct a variable measuring the excess of foreign males over 
foreign females in 1911, 1921 and 1926.
27 Finally, we construct variables of the proportions of females 
in various age categories to capture the distribution of ages of potential brides faced by grooms. Table 
4.2 presents descriptive statistics of these variables for before the war (1906 or 1911) and after the war 
(1921).
28 It shows that there were few changes in the occupation structure of men and women. The 
only notable change is a shift from self-employment to employees. Note also that our indicator of the 
excess of foreign males over foreign females captures the increase in immigration that followed WWI.  
   
4.3 Military mortality 
We use military mortality data from the French ministry of defense.
29 About 1.3 million men 
were classified as “dead for France” (“mort pour la France”) during WWI. This denomination 
includes men who died in combat, and men who died because of injuries or illness contracted while 
serving in the army..  
In the empirical analysis, we use information about the number of dead soldiers by département 
of birth (a total of 1,227,796 soldiers in continental France and Corsica for whom we observe birth 
département
30). Specifically, we use it to compute, for each département, the military mortality rate, 
which is defined as the number of dead soldiers as a percentage of the male population aged 18 to 59 in 
1911. Figure 1.1 shows the geographical variation in the military mortality rate across France. This 
                                                 
25 Ideally, we would restrict attention to the occupations of men who are old enough to be fathers of daughters of 
marriageable age, but such information is not available. 
26 We construct these indictors for the years 1906, 1921 and 1926 because comparable occupations are not available in the 
1911 census.  
27 From 1918 to 1930, many people immigrated to France to work in agriculture, construction and public works. The latter 
employed one third of all foreigners from 1921 to 1925 (Faron and George, 1999). 
28 We present the average over 87 départements for 1906 and 90 départements for 1921 since France’s territories increased 
after the war.  
29 Data and documentation are available at http://www.memoiredeshommes.sga.defense.gouv.fr/. 
30 This number excludes military deaths of soldiers born in the three départements acquired at the end of WWI (Moselle, 
Bas-Rhin and Haut-Rhin) because the French records for these départements are incomplete.    17
mortality rate ranges from 5 percent in the southern département of Alpes-Maritime to 23 percent in 
the département of Lozere. The mean and median mortality rates are about 12.5 percent. 
In addition to the natural randomness associated with war casualties, a few other factors may 
explain the regional heterogeneity in military mortality rate. During the first years of the war, men 
residing in the same military regions were typically sent together to the same war zones.
31 This was 
because soldiers were supposed to serve in their military regions of residence, and because men living 
in regions with high population density were sent together to the battlefront to complement the troops 
of the northeastern regions where most of the fighting was taking place (Boulanger, 2001; Maurin, 
1992).
32 The heterogeneity in military mortality may thus be partially explained by the fact that men 
from different départements participated in battles of different violence levels. Military mortality in 
1914 and 1915 constitutes about 49 percent of the total military deaths during WWI: 23 percent of the 
overall war casualties occurred in 1914, and 26 percent in 1915 (Becker, 1999). After 1916, men from 
different military regions were more mixed together at the battlefront for two reasons. First, starting in 
1915 but only fully implemented in 1916, the army adopted a national rather than regional conscription 
scheme to improve the allocation of men and skills to war zones (Boulanger, 2001). Second, the army 
started to dissolve regiments and mixed soldiers from different regions (Maurin, 1992). The reasons for 
this mixing are not documented by the army, but Maurin (1992) advances several hypothesis, including 
the desire of the generals to spread out casualties across regions and to limit the possibilities for mutiny 
by mixing together soldiers who did not know each other and who might even speak different dialects. 
However, these changes did not eliminate the regional differences in mortality. One possible 
reason for this seems to be that participation rates in the military varied by region. Explanations for this 
phenomenon remain speculative. Boulanger (2001) points out some factors. First, while draft policies 
were national, ultimate authority lay with the general of the military region. Generals’ personal 
interpretations or applications of directives may have differed, generating regional variations in 
exemption rates and rates of recovery of initially exempted men. Second, the rate of voluntary 
engagement was unequal, with higher proportions volunteering closer to the front and in places where 
entering the army was highly regarded by society.
33 Finally, regional differences in labor force 
specialization may have contributed to some extent to this heterogeneity because the army required 
                                                 
31 During WWI, continental France was separated into 22 military regions (Boulanger, 2001). 
32 For example, soldiers from Bretagne were sent to the Parisian region, while soldiers from the Parisian region went further 
east. 
33 According to Boulanger (2001), in some parts of France, conscription was an important step in a man’s life. Entry to the 
army was usually celebrated with folkloric parties. In those places, being classified as unfit for service was shameful.     18
specific skills during the war (e.g., knowledge about how to work leather or wood, or how to raise 
horses).  
 
5. Empirical Strategy 
If men and women prefer higher class spouses, then we would expect men (women) to marry 
higher class women (men) when the sex ratio, i.e. the ratio of men of marriageable age to women of 
marriageable age, is lower (higher). The exogenous change in sex ratio due to the war allows us to 
address the question of how the sex ratio affects marital assortative matching.  We first establish that in 
pre-WWI France marriage was not random, i.e. people tended to marry within class.  Second, we test 
the hypothesis that men married brides of higher class after the war than before the war. Finally, we 
test the hypothesis that men married women of higher class than themselves (married up) more in 
regions where more men died and where the sex ratio was lower.  
 
5.1 Testing for pre-WWI assortative matching  
Our first test aims to determine whether prior to WWI men tended to marry women of the same 
or similar class to themselves. If class was irrelevant for marriage, the distribution of bride classes 
would be the same for each class of groom. The null hypothesis of our test is that pre-war grooms 
chose brides randomly from the class distribution of pre-war brides.   
To implement this test, we compare the realized distribution of social distance, defined as the 
class of the bride minus the class of the groom, with the distribution we would expect under the null 
hypothesis that pre-war grooms married randomly. Using a bootstrapping method, we construct 95% 
confidence intervals for the distribution of social distance under the null hypothesis.  Specifically, 
denote the number of pre-war marriages in our sample by N.  From the distribution of groom classes, 
we draw N grooms randomly with replacement; from the distribution of bride classes we draw N brides 
randomly with replacement.  We match the list of grooms with the list of brides, and derive the 
distribution of social distances for this simulated set of marriages.  We repeat this process 1000 times.  
For each possible value of social distance, namely for every integer from -6 to +6, we order the 1000 
simulated proportions of marriages with that social distance, and take the middle 950 as the 95 percent 
confidence interval.  
An observed distribution of social distance with a higher peak and lower tails than the 
confidence intervals would indicate that grooms tended to marry brides of similar class to themselves, 
as opposed to matching randomly. 
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5.2 Testing for a change in the distribution of brides’ classes  
Second, we test whether, for each class of groom, the distribution of classes of brides was the 
same after WWI as before WWI. For each groom class, we plot the CDFs of bride class before the war 
and after the war in départements with mortality rates above the median. We then construct 95% 
confidence intervals for the CDFs using a bootstrapping method similar to that explained above. 
 
5.3 Testing the effect of military deaths and of the unbalanced sex ratio on marriage by class 
Finally, we subject the hypothesis that men married up after the war to regression analysis. The 
regressions also allow us to test the hypothesis that men married up more in regions where more men 
died or where the sex ratio was lower.  
 
5.3.1 OLS, probit and ordered probit specifications  
We run the OLS regressions pooling grooms of all classes, and include a dummy variable for each 
groom class. The most general form of the regressions is: 
, ijt j jt jt ijt ijt Yt M X Z α βλ μ δ ε =++ + + +  (1) 
where i is a marriage, j is a département (county), and t is the year of the wedding. We use three 
alternative dependent variables Y: (1) the difference between the class of the bride and the class of the 
groom; (2) a dummy for whether the groom married a bride of his own class or higher; and (3) a 
dummy for whether the groom married a low class bride, meaning a bride of class 5, 6, or 7. M is the 
explanatory variable of interest, which we take to be either the sex ratio, or military mortality as a 
percentage of the pre-war (1911) male population, or the predicted sex ratio instrumented with military 
mortality. We set military mortality to zero for marriages that occurred before the war. We cluster 
standard errors at the level of variation in M.
34  
The α j are coefficients on the département dummies and β  is the coefficient on the linear time 
trend.  X jt are other controls that vary across geography and time, such as variables capturing the 
occupational distribution of the population of women in the area and the excess of foreign men over 
foreign women. Zijt are additional controls that vary at the individual level such as whether the 
marriage took place in a rural location. The variables used in the analysis are described in more detail 
in Appendix C. 
                                                 
34 When the independent variable of interest is the sex ratio or the sex ratio instrumented with mortality, errors are clustered 
at the département-census year level.  When it is military mortality, the pre war observations are clustered together, and the 
post war observations are clustered at the département level.     20
Appendix D (described below) shows that the results are robust when probit and ordered probit 
regressions are used instead of OLS.  
Note that the lowest class is class 7 and the highest class is class 1 (see Section 4). Thus, men 
marry better when they marry a lower-index class bride. Note also that when the dependent variable is  
a dummy for whether the groom married a bride of class at least as high as his own, observations with 
class 7 grooms must be dropped, because this class necessarily marries weakly up. 
 
5.3.2. Instrumental variable specifications 
As pointed in the literature (e.g., Angrist 2002, Kerwin and Luoh 2005), studies that analyze the 
impact of the sex ratio on the marriage market may suffer from omitted variable bias and possibly 
reverse causality. For example, in our context, a low sex ratio may indicate strong male out-migration. 
If migrants are selected positively or negatively according to unobservable variables that are relevant 
for marriage outcomes (e.g., groom’s ability or health), the random error term in the equation above 
may be correlated with the sex ratio. Take for example the case of health (denoted here by  ijt H ) as 
omitted variable correlated with sex ratio because of migration. The correct OLS specification should 
be: 
. ijt j jt jt ijt ijt ijt Yt M X Z H α βλ μ δ η ε =++ + + + +   (2) 
If equation (2) is the correct specification but we omit  ijt H  from the estimation, the expected value of 
the estimator ofλ  will be:
  










λλ η =+  
We expect good health to improve the groom’s position in the marriage market, i.e. if  ijt Y  denotes the 
dummy for marrying up, we expect  0. η >  The direction of the omitted variable bias thus depends on 
the sign of  () cov , jt ijt M H , where  jt M  denotes the sex ratio. If migrants tend to be in better health than 
non-migrants, we expect to find men in better health than average in places with high sex ratios 
( () cov , 0 jt ijt MH > ), in which case the estimator of λ  will be biased upward. If migrants tend to be in 
poorer health than non-migrants, the estimator of λ  will be biased downward.
35 
                                                 
35 Note that when we use the difference between the class of the bride and the class of the groom or a dummy for whether 
the groom married a low class bride as dependent variables, we expect  0 η <  to capture that good health improves the 
groom’s position in the marriage market. In the regressions with those dependent variables, we therefore expect a    21
In order to deal with this potential issue, we use an instrumental variable (IV) approach. For our 
strategy to be valid, we need an instrument that predicts the sex ratio but is not directly related to 
marriage outcomes. We use département-level military mortality, which exhibits exogenous 
geographical variation (see Section 4.3), as an instrument for the département-level sex ratio. Given 
the universality of the military draft, military mortality is correlated with the post-war sex ratio. 
However, we do not expect military mortality to have a direct effect on marriage outcomes. This 
instrument is zero before the war and equal to the département-level mortality rates after the war. The 
instrumental variable specification uses (in both the first and the second stage) the same controls as the 
OLS specification presented above. 
 
6. Assortative matching by social class 
 
6.1. Testing pre-WWI assortative matching 
We first use pre-war data to test whether people marry within class as opposed to randomly. 
We do so by examining the distribution of social distance, defined as the class of the bride minus the 
class of the groom, among pre-war marriages. For example, when people marry within class, the social 
distance is zero. When a groom of class 1 (the highest class) marries a bride of class 7 (the lowest 
class), the social distance is 6.  The observed points in Figure 6.1 show the actual distribution of pre-
war social distance for the marriages in our sample.  The 95% confidence interval was derived by 
bootstrapping under the null hypothesis that grooms match randomly from the class distribution of 
observed brides.  
The observed distribution lies outside the confidence interval for most social distances.  For 
brides and grooms of the same class (i.e. at social distance zero), the observed proportion is nearly 
twice as large as the upper boundary of the confidence interval.  For the other social distances between 
-4 and +4, the observed proportions lie close to or below the lower bounds of the confidence intervals.  
For the extreme social distances, the observed proportions are approximately zero. 
Overall, the figure clearly rejects the null of random matching. Grooms in the pre-war period 
were much more likely to marry brides of their own class than chance would dictate, and were much 
less likely to marry brides who were socially distant from them.  
 
6.2. Change in distribution of brides’ classes 
                                                                                                                                                                       
downward bias if migrants are more likely to be in good health than non-migrants, and an upward bias if migrants are more 
likely to be in poor health.    22
Having established that men chose brides non-randomly from women of different classes and 
that the ratio of men to women was lower after WWI than before it, we now consider whether men of 
different classes married women of higher class after the war relative to before it, as theory would 
predict. 
The seven panels of Figure 6.2 show, for each class of groom, the cumulative distribution 
functions (CDFs) of bride classes before and after the war. For these figures we use data only from the 
départements with military mortality rates above the median, where we expect the pre-war/post-war 
difference to be the most pronounced.
36 A dashed red post-war line that lies above the solid black pre-
war line indicates the groom class tended to marry higher class brides after the war than before it. For 
all classes except the lowest, class 7, the post-war line lies largely, if not entirely, above the pre-war 
line, indicating that grooms of these classes married brides of higher class after the war than before it. 
To formally test whether these differences are statistically significant, we construct 95% confidence 
intervals of the pre-war CDFs using a bootstrapping approach. For classes 2 to 6, we can reject the 
hypothesis that the pre-war and post-war CDFs are equal in favor of the alternative hypothesis that post 
war grooms were more likely to marry higher class brides.
37  
Overall, it appears that, if we do not take into account other factors that changed between the 
pre-war and post-war periods, groom of classes 2 to 6 married higher class brides after the war than 
before it. 
 
6.3. Impact of change in military deaths and sex ratio on marriage by class 
We next subject the hypothesis that men married up after the war to regression analysis. The 
regressions also allow us to use the exogenous geographical variation in military mortality in WWI. If 
improvements in the marriage outcomes of men after the war are caused by the mechanism we 
propose, these improvements will be greatest in regions where military mortality or the change in the 
sex ratio was largest. 
To examine the direct relationship between military mortality and marriage outcomes, we run 
OLS regressions that use either military mortality or sex ratio, and IV regressions that use military 
mortality as an instrument for the sex ratio, to predict whether and to what extent men married up. For 
the two dependent variables that take only values of zero or one, namely the dummy for married up 
                                                 
36 We also include the three departements from Alsace-Lorraine for which mortality rates are known to be very high but on 
which we do not have exact mortality data.  
37 We also test this hypothesis using Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests. The KS tests reject the null for class 4 grooms only, 
probably because of small sample sizes which are: class 1: 26; class 2: 156; class 3: 233; class 4: 493; class 5: 174; class 6: 
74; class 7: 58.    23
(second dependent variable) and the low class bride dummy (third dependent variable), we also run 
probit regressions in addition to OLS. Tables D1 and D2 of Appendix D show that the results are 
robust when probit is used instead of OLS.  As an alternative to the OLS specifications that predict 
class difference and include dummy variables for the class of the groom as controls, we run ordered 
probits that predict the class of the bride and control for the groom’s class. Table D3 of Appendix D 
shows that the results are robust to this ordered probit specification. 
Across the specifications with our three different dependent variables, namely the class 
difference between the bride and the groom, a dummy variable for marrying up and a dummy variable 
for low bride class, the coefficient on mortality, the sex ratio, or the instrumented sex ratio is of the 
expected sign and significant at conventional significance levels, including when département 
dummies, a linear time trend, and a full set of controls are included.  
 
6.3.1. Mortality rate 
             Table 6.1 presents the results for different specifications of the OLS regression using the three 
alternative dependent variables of marrying up and using the département-level mortality rate as the 
main independent variable.
38 All specifications include département dummies and dummy variables for 
the class of the groom to reflect differences in marriage patterns for men of different classes.  
             The  coefficient  on  mortality  has  the  sign  predicted  by  theory  and  is  significant  in  all 
specifications, including the most complete specifications containing département dummies, linear 
time trends and a full set of additional controls. The regressions suggest that men were more likely to 
marry up in places with higher mortality rates.
39 For example, in the regressions predicting whether the 
groom married up, the coefficient on military mortality is 0.005, which implies that a département 
having military mortality of 15 percent of the male population instead of 10 percent would increase the 
probability a given groom married up by 2.5 percentage points. Another example is the regression 
predicting whether the bride is low class, where the coefficient on military mortality is -0.010, which 
implies that a departement having military mortality of 15 percent of the male population instead of 10 
percent would decrease the probability a given groom married a low class bride by 5 percentage 
points.
40 
              In the second specification of each dependent variable in Table 6.1, we control for rural and 
urban marriages, where marriage patterns might be different. One possible concern is that grooms after 
                                                 
38 As mentioned earlier, the mortality variable is defined as zero for pre-WWI marriages and military mortalities as a 
percentage of the pre-war male population for post-WWI marriages. 
39 Recall that class 1 women are the highest class.  
40 Our results are robust to the use of a probit model rather than OLS for the binary dependent variables. See Appendix D.    24
WWI might be marrying brides of higher class because there were more women of higher class in the 
population after the war.  We attempt to control for this effect by including controls for the percentages 
of the female labor force in different occupations that reflect different classes. Unfortunately, the 
available breakdown by occupation for the female population is at a higher level of aggregation than 
the class data for brides and grooms, so these controls are imperfect. We also control for the excess of 
foreign males in the region over foreign females, which is calculated as the percentage of males who 
are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign.
41  The rationale for including excess 
foreign men is that the post-war shortage of French men caused an inflow of foreign men into France, 
who may have differed from French men in their desirability as husbands. We also control for the ages 
of the bride and groom to address the fact that older grooms or brides may have better occupations, and 
may thus be of higher class.   
The coefficient on the dummy for rural marriages is statistically significant in the regression 
predicting class difference, with a sign that implies grooms in rural areas marry lower class brides than 
grooms in urban areas.  The coefficients on the percentage of employee and unemployed women 
indicate that men tend to marry women of lower class where more unemployed women are present and 
to marry women of higher class when more employees are present.
42 The coefficient on excess foreign 
males is significant in the regression predicting marrying up and that predicting a low bride class, with 
signs that suggest that in regions of France where there are more foreign males relative to the number 
of foreign females, men tend to marry brides of lower class. This is consistent with the idea that 
foreign males represented additional competition in the marriage market. The coefficients associated 
with the ages of the groom and the bride are not statistically significant.
43  
Note that the estimations do not take into account the proportion of injured by département, since 
no such data are available. A potential concern is that men who were severely injured might have had 
less marriage opportunities, which may affect our estimation results. Here we do a “back of the 
envelope” conservative calculation of how our coefficient would be affected if we were able to account 
for these men. Assume that severely injured men could not get married, i.e. they were also removed 
from the marriage market. From 1914 to 1918, the estimate varies from 3.5 to 5.2 million injured 
soldiers (Prost, 2008). After the war, 920,000 of the survivors were eligible to receive a pension from 
the state because of their disability (Corvisier, 1992). If we consider the limit case in which all those 
                                                 
41 We also experimented with including the percentages of foreign females and foreign males separately.  In most cases the 
coefficients on these two variables were of opposite sign, and comparable magnitude. 
42 Note that the omitted category of female occupations is workers. 
43 In other regressions, we also add an indicator for whether the groom or the bride is re-marrying. The coefficients 
associated with those indicators are not statistically significant, and they do not change the magnitude of the coefficient 
associated with mortality (tables not shown).    25
receiving a pension were unable to get married, this would reduce the magnitude of our coefficients on 
military mortality (which in this case would be interpreted as men removed from the marriage market) 
by approximately 43%.
44   
 
6.3.2. Sex ratio 
Next, we run regressions that directly use the sex ratio to predict whether and to what extent 
men married women of higher class than themselves. Table 6.2 presents the results of OLS regressions 
using the sex ratio as the main independent variable of interest. These regressions include the same sets 
of additional controls as presented above in Table 6.1. The sex ratio variable varies by département and 
over three census periods. The IV regressions, where we instrument the potentially endogenous sex 
ratio with département-level military mortality rate, are presented in Table 6.3. Panel A of this table 
presents the first stage regressions of the sex ratio on military mortality. Panel B presents the second 
stage regressions using the instrumented sex ratio as the main independent variable.  
For each of the three different dependent variables that we consider, the OLS coefficient 
associated with the sex ratio is statistically significant at standard significance levels and has the sign 
predicted by theory. Each IV coefficient is of the same sign but somewhat larger in absolute value than 
the corresponding OLS coefficient. For example, in the class difference regression that includes the 
full set of controls, the IV coefficient associated with the sex ratio is 2.685 compared with the OLS 
coefficient of 1.633. To keep the example discussed in Section 5, this is consistent with migrants being 
in better health than non-migrants. The instrumented sex ratio’s coefficient is always precisely 
estimated. Note that in the first stage of the IV estimation, military mortality, our instrument, appears 
as a strong predictor of the sex ratio.
45  
          The more general IV regression predicting class difference (column 2 of Table 6.3) suggests that 
a decrease in the sex ratio from one man for every woman to 0.90 men for every woman would 
improve the expected class of bride married by a given groom by 0.27, from an average class 
difference of 0.21 to -0.06. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6.3 present the IV regression results predicting 
whether the groom married up. In the more general specification (column 4), the coefficient on the sex 
ratio is -0.822, implying that a decrease in the sex ratio from one man for every women to 0.90 men for 
every woman would increase the probability a given groom married up by 8.2 percentage points. 
                                                 
44 Military mortality totaled 1,227,796 men, so the sum of mortality plus injured is 2,147,796.  Treating all these men as 
military deaths implies we should scale our coefficients by (1,227,796 / 2,147,796), which is equal to 0.57.  Hence the 
coefficients would decrease in magnitude by 43%. 
45 The F-statistics for the identifying instruments as a group are all 100 or higher.    26
Column 6 of Table 6.3 suggests that a similar decrease in the sex ratio would decrease the probability a 
given groom married a low class bride by 18.5 percentage points.  
We take the results in this section and in Section 6.3.1 as evidence that on average men prefer 
women of higher class, i.e. that men have vertical preferences. Note that, as discussed in Section 3, if 
grooms had horizontal preferences a decrease in the sex ratio would not lead grooms to marry up more. 
Rather, it would leave assortative matching unchanged. Thus, ours results favor the hypothesis that 
assortative matching occurs because in equilibrium individuals cannot marry higher-class people, 
although they may wish to do so. A related question follows. What prevents men from marrying higher 
class women when the sex ratio is balanced? One possible explanation is that, when the sex ratio is 
balanced, women do not accept marriage proposals from men in lower social classes. A possible 
alternative explanation is that men simply do not get to meet women from higher classes when the sex 
ratio is balanced. Unfortunately, the literature on the French marriage market does not provide us with 
guidance on the relative relevance of these two alternatives. However, our findings suggest that the 
former must be at least part of the explanation. Suppose, in contradiction, that men are unable to marry 
up under balanced sex ratio only because they do not meet women from higher classes. If men are still 
not more likely to meet women of higher classes after the war, it is immediate that the social ascension 
of men that we document would not occur. If instead the war enabled men to meet women from more 
heterogeneous backgrounds, including women of higher classes, then a systematic social ascension of 
men would be unlikely to occur unless women changed their “acceptance behavior” of marriage 
proposals. 
 
6.3.3. Differential impact of the sex imbalance by groom’s class 
  The previous regressions show that men improved their marriage outcomes more in the post-
war period relative to the pre-war period in places with higher mortality or where the sex ratio fell 
more. An important related question is whether the social ascension was homogenous across groom 
classes. To address this issue, we allow the sex imbalance to affect marrying up differently for each 
groom class by interacting the sex ratio and mortality with the seven grooms’ classes. The results are 
presented in Tables E1 and E2 of Appendix E. 
  The regressions suggest the effect of a change in the sex ratio (or mortality) on marriage 
outcomes differs by groom’s class. Specifically, while grooms of higher and middle social class 
benefited from the sex imbalance, grooms of the lowest social classes (classes 6 and 7) appear to have 
benefited the least from the decrease in the sex ratio. In particular, the coefficients associated with the 
sex ratio or mortality are usually not statistically significant for classes 6 and 7.      27
  This heterogeneity in the impact of the change in sex ratio on marriage outcome by class, with 
men in low classes benefiting the least, may result from several contributing factors. One factor may be 
that very low class men did not marry up because women have a lower threshold on the class of spouse 
they are willing to accept, below which they prefer to stay single. That is, while high and middle-class 
women were willing to marry men from lower social classes, they may not have been willing to accept 
proposals from men with a very low social class. Another possible factor may be a mechanical one due 
to different class sizes. We investigate this possibility in Appendix F where we show that, under some 
relatively weak assumptions, if grooms married as high class brides as possible after the war, classes 6 
and 7 actually should have been those improving the most in the marriage market. This suggests that 
differences in class sizes do not explain the differential impact of the change in sex ratio across classes 
of groom.  
 
6.3.4. Urban versus rural  
  Marriage behavior in rural areas may have been different from that in urban areas. For instance, 
rural places were less densely populated and people in a village may have been more likely to interact 
with people from different classes. As a result, search frictions and meeting technology may have 
differed in rural places. In addition, preferences for spouses might have been different in rural 
compared with urban areas. To test the robustness of our findings, we examine whether the effect of 
sex ratio on assortative matching is the same in rural and urban areas. The regressions presented in 
Tables G1 and G2 in Appendix G show that the unbalanced sex ratio had an effect both in rural and 
urban localities, and that the effects were similar in magnitude.  
 
6.3.5. Class imputation for brides without occupations 
In our data set, a substantial proportion of the brides are reported on their marriage certificates 
as having no occupation: 34.4% of the brides are without occupation before the war and 40.5% after 
the war (see Table 4.1).
46 In addition, 12% of the brides have missing occupations overall. A missing 
occupation could reflect that a bride had no occupation at the time of marriage or that she simply did 
not report her professional activity. Thus far, the brides without occupations have been excluded from 
our analysis, as we do not observe an occupation to allocate them to a class. Figure H1 in Appendix H 
presents the marriage outcomes of brides with no occupation and missing occupations. It shows that 
                                                 
46 This proportion is lower than the proportion of overall women out of the labor force: 61% in the 1906 census, and 57.4% 
in the 1921 census (see Table 1.1).  This difference probably reflects a tendency of women to drop out of the labor force 
upon marriage or giving birth. Also, unemployed women may consider themselves as “without occupation.” Table 4.2 
shows that a very small proportion of women in the labor force are categorized as unemployed.    28
brides with no occupation are more likely to marry grooms of classes 1 and 2 than brides with 
occupations. Moreover, they are as likely to marry class 3 and 4 men, and less likely to marry grooms 
from classes 5 to 7.  Relative to brides with occupations, women with missing occupation are much 
more likely to marry class 1 grooms, somewhat more likely to marry class 4, and less likely to marry 
classes 3 and 5. This heterogeneity in marriage outcomes suggests that brides with no or missing 
occupation may be of various types. For example, they may be wealthy women who do not need to 
work, women involved in household production such as working on the family farm and who consider 
themselves as not having an occupation (Chesnais, 1999), or unemployed women.
47  
Marriage certificates provide information on the occupations of the parents of the grooms and 
brides. Our first approach to allocate a bride without occupation into a class is to use the occupation of 
her father. We have replicated the estimations presented in Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 using the class of 
the bride’s father when the bride has no occupation. The results of these estimations are shown in 
Tables H1 to H3 of Appendix H, and present similar results to the estimations from Sections 6.3.1 and 
6.3.2, though the main coefficients of interest are smaller in magnitude.  
A main disadvantage of the approach of using the bride’s father’s class when the bride has no 
occupation is that parents’ occupations are missing for almost half of the data, and they may not be 
missing at random. A common reason for parents’ occupation to be missing is that they have died. 
Since there is differential mortality by socioeconomic status (see, for example, Smith 1999), parents’ 
occupations are more likely to be missing for lower classes and the resulting sample selected.  
Thus, as an alternative approach for dealing with both brides with missing occupations and 
brides with no occupation, we have imputed class for all brides with missing classes.  We use the 
predicted class obtained from an OLS regression of bride’s class (for brides with occupations) on the 
following variables: indicators of mother’s and father’s classes,
48 an indicator for rural, interactions of 
rural with the indicators for parents’ classes, bride’s age and age squared, dummies for the size of the 
city where the marriage occurred, and a linear time trend. The various indicators for missing class of 
parents allow us to deal with the fact that those observations are potentially not missing at random. We 
                                                 
47 An alternative explanation is that women without occupations are simply younger women who are not yet employed. 
However, this does not seem to be the case since the mean and median age of brides with and without occupations before 
the war are very similar. The pre-war mean age of brides without occupations is 24.6 compared with 24.9 for brides with 
occupations. We cannot reject that the average prewar age of brides of class 1 to 7 is different to the average age of brides 
without occupation at any reasonable significance level. Moreover, the 25
th percentile, median and 75
th percentile of the 
distribution of age are 20, 23 and 27 in both groups.   
48 More precisely, a set of dummy variables, one for each identified class, that are also zero if the parent’s class is 
unknown, an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the parent's class is missing because he or she is dead, and an 
indicator variable for the parent's class being missing because he or she has no occupation.  The omitted category is the 
parent has no class for an unknown reason.    29
control for age since age and occupation may be related. The city size and rural dummies allow for 
classes to be associated with geographic location. With this approach, a bride’s imputed class 
incorporates more information than that provided by her father’s class alone. Table H4 presents the 
results of this OLS regression.  
In Tables H5 to H7, we evaluate the impacts of mortality and the sex ratio on our measures of 
marrying up using bride’s actual class for brides with occupations and bride’s imputed class for those 
without occupations or with missing occupations.
49 Specifically, we replicate the analysis described in 
Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2. The coefficient associated with the sex ratio or mortality has the sign 
predicted by theory in all the specifications, and it is statistically significant.  The magnitudes of the 
coefficients are similar to in the regressions without imputation when we use mortality as the 
dependent variable, but are somewhat smaller when we use sex ratio.  
 
6.3.6 Assortative matching by father’s class 
In some marriages, the social class of the spouse’s father might be relevant. This may be 
because these brides and grooms cared about the social class of their spouse’s father, or because these 
marriages were arranged by the parents. In this section, we repeat the main analysis using brides’ 
fathers’ and grooms’ fathers’ classes.
50 We use the same set of controls as previously, with one 
exception: instead of controlling for the percentage of females working in various occupation 
categories (which was meant to capture the distribution of women’s occupations faced by men), we 
control here for the percentage of men working in various occupation categories (to capture the 
distribution of fathers’ occupations). Note that father’s class has the advantage that it is pre-determined 
and not likely to respond to the marriage market conditions or to the change in the sex ratio. However, 
as discussed, fathers’ classes are missing for almost half the observations so the remaining sample is 
small. Tables B1 to B3 of Appendix B present the estimation results. The results are qualitatively the 
same, namely men married up more (in terms of father’s social class) in regions that experienced 
sharper decrease in the sex ratio due to war mortality. However, the results are weaker and less 
statistically significant in some specifications, potentially due to smaller sample size.  
 
7. Assortative matching by age 
                                                 
49 Because bride classes are imputed as predicted class from an OLS regression, they are generally not whole numbers.  In 
the regression predicting class difference, bride classes are not rounded.  However, in creating the variables married up and 
low class bride, we first round predicted class to the nearest whole number.  Thus, for example, a class 3 groom marrying a 
bride with imputed class 3.4 will be taken to be marrying a weakly higher class bride. 
50 The correlation between the classes of grooms and the classes of their fathers is 0.46.  The correlation between the classes 
of brides and the classes of their fathers is 0.33.    30
Our analysis thus far has focused on assortative matching by social class, which captures an 
important dimension of “attractiveness”. Clearly, there are other related and unrelated dimensions 
considered by individuals when choosing a spouse, such as income, education, appearance, 
personality, and age. In this section, we analyze the effects of military mortality and the unbalanced 
sex ratio on assortative matching by age, on which we have data. While Henry (1966) and Chasteland 
and Pressat (1962) have documented the change in age gap following the war, we analyze here 
whether the change was more pronounced in places with high mortality. We follow the same empirical 
strategy we used to analyze assortative matching by social class (described in Section 5). 
 
7.1. Testing pre-WWI assortative matching 
We first use pre-war data to test whether people sort according to age in the marriage market. 
In Figure 7.1, the observed points show the actual distribution of pre-war age gap for the marriages in 
our sample. The 95% confidence interval was derived by bootstrapping under the null hypothesis that 
grooms match randomly from the age distribution of observed brides.  
The observed distribution reaches its highest density levels when the value of brides’ age minus 
groom’s age is between -2 and -5, indicating that grooms are typically slightly older than their brides. 
Overall, for about 46% of the pre-WWI marriages in our data this age difference lies between -5 and 0 
inclusive. Figure 7.1 shows that the observed distribution lies outside the confidence interval for many 
age differences. In particular, the observed distribution lies above the 95% confidence interval when 
the groom is just slightly older than the bride, and lies below the confidence interval for larger age 
gaps. Thus, the null hypothesis of random matching according to age is clearly rejected. Grooms in the 
pre-war period were much more likely to marry brides who were a couple of years younger than 
themselves than chance would dictate. 
 
7.2. Changes in the distribution of age difference 
Having established that grooms and brides match non-randomly according to age, we now 
investigate the impact of a change in the sex ratio on this assortative matching. 
The three panels of Figure 7.2 show the CDFs of age difference between brides and grooms 
before and after the war. The first graph in each panel uses data from the départements with military 
mortality rates above the median, where we expect the pre-war/post-war difference to be the most 
pronounced. The second graph in each panel uses data from départements with below-median 
mortality rates. A dashed red post-war line that lies below the solid black pre-war line indicates that 
grooms tended to marry older brides after the war than before it.     31
The first panel shows the CDFs for grooms aged 18-59. It illustrates that in high-mortality 
départements, the age difference between brides and grooms was smaller after the war than before it. 
For example, while in those départements the bride was at least 5 years younger than her groom in 
47% of pre-war marriages, this proportion decreased to 36% after the war. To formally test whether 
this difference is statistically significant, we construct 95% confidence intervals of the pre-war CDFs 
using a bootstrapping approach. We can reject the hypothesis that the pre-war and post-war CDFs are 
equal in favor of the alternative hypothesis that post war grooms were more likely to marry older 
brides. As expected, this effect is smaller in départements with below-median mortality rates, where 
42% of the pre-war marriages had a bride at least 5 years younger than her groom, and this proportion 
decreased to 34% after the war.  
The next two panels show similar CDFs for two different age groups: men aged 18-27 and men 
aged 28-59. Both graphs present a similar pattern to that described above. However, they highlight that 
the change in the age difference was stronger for younger men. The change in the CDF is clearly 
statistically significant for men aged 18-27 in both high and low-mortality départements. The change 
in age difference is less marked among men aged 28 to 59. This finding is consistent with the fact that 
younger men experienced higher mortality rates in the war than older men, and so we expect more 
adjustments in the marriage patterns of those men. Overall, this suggests that even a small change in 
the sex ratio has an impact on assortative matching by age.  
 
7.3. Impact of military deaths and change in sex ratio on assortative matching by age 
We now examine the direct relationship between sex ratio and age-related marriage outcomes. 
We run OLS regressions that use bride’s age minus groom’s age as the dependent variable, and either 
military mortality or the sex ratio as the main explanatory variable. We also conduct IV regressions 
that instrument for the sex ratio with military mortality.  
             The first three columns of Table 7.1 present the results of the OLS regressions using the 
département-level mortality rate as the main independent variable. The three specifications include 
département dummies, a linear time trend and the groom’s age to reflect differences in marriage 
patterns for men of different ages. We include dummy variables for grooms in different age ranges to 
allow the groom’s age have a non-linear effect on age difference. To capture the distribution of 
women’s ages faced by grooms, we control for the proportion of women in different age groups in 
each departement. Finally, we take into account the excess foreign males who may represent additional 
competition to men in the marriage market.      32
The coefficient associated with mortality is positive and statistically significant suggesting a 
greater decrease in the age gap between brides and grooms in places with higher mortality. Consider a 
difference of bride’s age minus groom’s age equal to -4 before the war. Everything else equal, this 
difference would increase to -2.94 in places with mortality rate equal to 10%, and to -2.41 in places 
with mortality rates equal to 15%.  
Since older women may have better occupations, the results highlighted above might merely 
reflect men’s preferences for higher class women. To address this issue, we control for bride’s and 
groom’s class in column (2). We find the same effect: men tend to marry older brides in places with 
higher mortality, and the coefficient is statistically significant.  
The last column allows for differential impact of mortality by groom’s age category. The effect 
of mortality on the age gap is statistically significant at the 5 percent level for grooms aged 22 to 33, 
and is the largest in magnitude for grooms aged 25 to 30. 
A decrease in the age difference between grooms and brides could be driven by grooms being 
younger or brides being older on average after the war than before. Figure 7.3 presents the distribution 
of age of brides and grooms before and after the war. While the distribution of brides’ age did not 
change, grooms married younger after the war than before it. The shortage of men allowed them to 
reduce the age gap and therefore to find brides who would have rather married older men before the 
war. The fact that men married at a younger age after the war is consistent with several plausible 
explanations. Men may prefer to marry at a younger age but were turned down before the war by 
women who preferred older men. Alternatively, due to the change in sex ratio, men may have received 
more marriage proposals after the war and thus spent less time searching for a partner.  
Looking at the other coefficients in columns 1 to 3 of Table 7.1, one notices that the age gap 
between brides and grooms increases with groom’s age. The coefficient associated with rural is 
negative and statistically significant in all specifications. This suggests that the age difference between 
the brides and the grooms is more negative in rural places than in urban places.  
The last three columns of Table 7.1 present similar results using sex ratio as the main 
explanatory variable. Results are similar to those for military mortality. The coefficient associated with 
sex ratio is negative and statistically significant at 1%. Allowing for a differential impact of sex ratio 
by age category provides similar results as for mortality, with the coefficients being the largest for 
grooms aged 25 to 33.  
Table 7.2 provides the results of the IV regressions predicting age difference. The instrumented 
sex ratio has a negative coefficient and is statistically significant at 1%. The coefficient is much larger 
than the OLS coefficients, implying that the OLS estimator is biased towards zero. Using the    33
specification controlling for grooms’ and brides’ classes suggests that a decrease in sex ratio from 1 to 
0.9 decreases the age difference between brides and grooms by 2 years. Thinking about health as an 
omitted variable that may be biasing our OLS results (see discussion in Section 5), this bias toward 
zero is consistent with migrants being healthier than non-migrants (i.e.,  () cov , 0 jt ijt MH > ) and 
healthier men marrying younger brides than men in poorer health  (i.e.,  0 η < ). 
 
8. Conclusion 
Although the similarity of spouses to each other along various dimensions has been 
documented, we know little about its causes. This paper uses an exogenous shock to the sex ratio 
created by WWI mortality in France to identify the underlying mechanisms responsible for marital 
assortative matching. Overall, we find that the decrease in the proportion of men in the population due 
to war-related mortality allowed men to marry higher class women. Men experienced “social 
ascension” by marrying women from classes they would have had few chances to marry before the 
war. Similarly, the change in sex ratio led women of higher classes to marry grooms from lower 
classes than they would have under pre-WWI standards. A decrease in the sex ratio, instrumented for 
by military mortality, from one man for every woman to 0.90 men for every woman: (a) increased the 
probability that men married women of weakly higher class than themselves by 8.2 percentage points, 
(b) improved the expected value of bride’s class minus groom’s class for a given groom by 0.27 (from 
an average of 0.21 to -0.06), and (c) decreased the probability a given groom would marry a low class 
bride by 18.5 percentage points. These effects differ by grooms’ class, with low-class men benefiting 
the least from the change in the sex ratio. Our results favor the hypothesis that assortative matching 
occurs because, although individuals would rather marry higher-class people, they do not receive 
marriage proposals from them.  
This paper illustrates a forgotten consequence common to brutal wars and imbalances in the sex 
ratio such as the one observed nowadays in China: the change in social mobility through change in 
marriage behavior. In France, the post-war period was also associated with more international 
marriages, which probably eased the integration of migrants within the French society. One may 
wonder whether the war induced a transitional or permanent change in social mobility and social 
integration. This is left for future research. On this specific front, an obstacle to overcome is the 
occurrence of WWII which may hinder the analysis of the long-term implications of WWI on social 
mobility. Another natural extension is to examine the extent of marrying up in other countries that 
participated in WWI. Such a study could shed light on the different degree of social mobility in 
different countries.    34
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This map shows the geographic variation in military mortality rates, defined as military 
deaths as a percentage of the male population aged 18 to 59 in 1911.  Totally white 
corresponds to a mortality rate of 6.2%, the 5
th percentile; totally red corresponds to a 
mortality rate of 17.0%, the 95
th percentile.  Blue denotes missing data. 
 
 
Table 1.1: Distribution of the labor force by sectors (in %) 
Source: Huber (1931). Repartition using 1906 territory for both years 
 1906  1921 
Sectors  males females males females 
Fishing  0.6 0.1 0.6  0 
Agriculture and forestry  43.8  43.2  39.9  45.9 
Industry and transportation  37.9  32.7  41.8  28.7 
Sales  10.4 10.1 10.4 11.7 
Liberal  professions  2.4 2.5 2.3 3.4 
Public  service  3.5 1.3 4.2 2.3 
Domestic 1.4  10.1  0.8  8 
% of the pop. in the labor force  68.2  39.0  71.2  42.6 
  
Table 2.1: Distribution of fatalities by occupation at age 20 (in %) 
Source: Huber (1931) 




Liberal professions  2.4 
Civil servant  1.3 
Domestic 4.2 
Clergy 0.2 




Figure 2.1: Number of first marriages per 1,000 women by birth cohorts and years 
Source: Henry (1966) 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Percentage of singles at age 50 by birth cohorts 
Source: Roussel (1971) 
 





%Table 2.2: Women were more likely to be unmarried in areas with higher mortality rates and lower sex ratios 
          
Dependent variable: fraction of women who aren't married 
 
                               (1)            (2)            (3)            (4)            (5)            (6)            (7)            (8)    
 
Military Mortality           0.003***       0.003***       0.005***       0.003***                                                             
                           (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.001)        (0.000)                                                                
Sex Ratio                                                                               -0.300***      -0.295***      -0.255***      -0.028    
                                                                                       (0.032)        (0.023)        (0.036)        (0.026)    
Departement Dummies             No            Yes             No            Yes             No            Yes             No            Yes    
Census Period Dummies           No             No            Yes            Yes             No             No            Yes            Yes    
 
R-Squared                    0.136          0.914          0.208          0.974          0.254          0.911          0.293          0.967    
Observations                   254            254            254            254            260            260            260            260    
 
Notes: An observation is a departement in a census period (1911, 1921 or 1926).  The sex ratio is defined as men aged 18-59 divided by women aged 15-49.  Military 
mortality is the mortality rate of soldiers as a percentage of the male population aged 18 to 59 in 1911; it is set to zero for departements in the pre-war period.  
Unmarried women include women who have never been married, widowed women, and divorced women.  Standard errors are given in parentheses.  Asterisks indicate: * 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
  
Table 4.1: Distribution of grooms and brides by class 
   Grooms  Brides 
Classes Pre-WWI  Post-WWI  Pre-WWI  Post-WWI 
1 5.4  7.1  0.7  1.2 
2 17.8  20.3  6.3  10.5 
3 24.1  24.2  20.1  13.3 
4 22.9  22.3  9.8  10.5 
5 19.9  16.8  21.9  18.2 
6 5.4  5.4  4.2  4.1 
7 4.0  3.2  2.7  1.8 
No occupation  0.6  0.8  34.4  40.5 
N 1,605  4,254  1,482  3,950 
 
   Grooms’ Fathers  Brides’ Fathers 
Classes Pre-WWI  Post-WWI  Pre-WWI  Post-WWI 
1 8.5  7.3  7.0  7.0 
2 13.3  13.4  13.1  14.0 
3 14.0  16.5  16.3  14.2 
4 38.8  35.5  36.2  36.3 
5 12.5  13.2  13.4  14.4 
6 6.7  7.0  6.1  8.1 
7 4.5  4.1  6.1  4.1 
No occupation  1.5  3.0  1.8  1.9 
N 949  2,372  1,014  2,560 
 
 
Table 4.2: Summary statistics 
      Pre War  Post War 
     
Mean  Standard 
deviation  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Mortality 0  0  12.5  3.0 
Sex ratio  1.12  0.09  1.02  0.08 
% Female managers  43.3  13.0  41.5  12.5 
% Female employees  3.8  1.2  7.6  3.3 
% Female workers  29.3  7.7  29.9  7.9 
% Self-employed females  23.1  7.2  19.6  5.5 
% Unemployed females  0.5  0.5  1.4  1.4 
% Male managers  30.7  8.7  31.4  10.3 
% Male employees  11.6  5.8  11.2  5.2 
% Male workers  38.8  6.9  42.7  8.2 
% Self-employed males  18.0  4.1  13.3  3.8 
% Unemployed males  0.9  0.7  1.4  1.2 
Excess foreign males  0.3  0.6  1.1  1.4 
% Females aged 15 to 19  16.2  1.4  16.7  1.4 
% Females aged 20 to 29  29.9  1.4  29.1  1.2 
% Females aged 30 to 39  28.3  1.0  27.6  0.9 
% Females aged 40 to 49  25.6  1.6  26.6  1.7 
The pre-war statistics are from 1911 for all variables except the female occupations, which are from 1906; the post-war 






Figure 6.2: The distribution of bride classes for each class of groom before and after WWI in 
departements with mortality rates above the median 
 


















































 Table 6.1: Men marry up more where military mortality was higher, OLS 
                          
Dependent variable: 
                            class diff   class diff   married up   married up    low bride    low bride    
 
Military Mortality              -0.016**     -0.012*       0.006***     0.005**     -0.011***    -0.010*** 
                               (0.006)      (0.006)      (0.002)      (0.002)      (0.003)      (0.003)    
Rural                                         0.186***                 -0.032                    -0.034    
                                            (0.064)                   (0.020)                   (0.022)    
% Female Managers                            -0.007                    -0.006**                   0.003    
                                            (0.008)                   (0.003)                   (0.003)    
% Female Employees                           -0.048***                  0.007*                   -0.016*** 
                                            (0.009)                   (0.004)                   (0.004)    
% Female Self-Employed                       -0.018*                   -0.012***                  0.006*   
                                            (0.010)                   (0.003)                   (0.003)    
% Female Unemployed                           0.098***                 -0.045***                  0.054*** 
                                            (0.016)                   (0.006)                   (0.007)    
Excess Foreign Males                         -0.051                    -0.025**                   0.035*** 
                                            (0.041)                   (0.011)                   (0.011)    
Groom's Age (/100)                            0.381                     0.158                     0.156    
                                            (0.340)                   (0.124)                   (0.111)    
Bride's Age (/100)                           -0.581                    -0.080                    -0.086    
                                            (0.416)                   (0.133)                   (0.188)    
Groom Class Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Departement Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Linear Time Trend                  Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
 
R-Squared                        0.241        0.243        0.271        0.273        0.234        0.236    
Observations                      3158         3117         3033         2994         3158         3117 
 
Notes: The dependent variable for the first two columns is the class of the bride minus the class of the groom, where a 
higher value for class corresponds to a lower class.  The dependent variable for the third and fourth columns is a dummy 
variable that takes the value one if the bride was at least as high class as the groom.  The dependent variable for the 
last two columns is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bride was of low class (class 5, 6 or 7).  Military 
mortality is the mortality rate of soldiers as a percentage of the male population aged 18 to 59 in 1911, and is zero for 
marriages that occurred before the war.  The omitted category for female occupations is workers.  Excess foreign males is 
defined as the percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign.  Standard errors, 
given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable military mortality.  Asterisks indicate: * 




Table 6.2: Men marry up more when the sex ratio is lower, OLS 
                          
Dependent variable: 
                            class diff   class diff   married up   married up    low bride    low bride    
 
Sex Ratio                        0.847**      1.633**     -0.448***    -0.658**      0.714***     1.302*** 
                               (0.410)      (0.688)      (0.153)      (0.285)      (0.207)      (0.280)    
Rural                                         0.203***                 -0.042*                   -0.026    
                                            (0.071)                   (0.024)                   (0.026)    
% Female Managers                            -0.015                     0.002                    -0.008    
                                            (0.015)                   (0.006)                   (0.006)    
% Female Employees                           -0.006                    -0.004                    -0.000    
                                            (0.023)                   (0.007)                   (0.009)    
% Female Self-Employed                       -0.002                    -0.005                     0.002    
                                            (0.019)                   (0.006)                   (0.008)    
% Female Unemployed                           0.021                    -0.004                     0.017**  
                                            (0.020)                   (0.006)                   (0.007)    
Excess Foreign Males                          0.002                    -0.006                     0.007    
                                            (0.063)                   (0.016)                   (0.020)    
Groom's Age (/100)                            0.194                     0.194                     0.101    
                                            (0.482)                   (0.151)                   (0.180)    
Bride's Age (/100)                           -0.514                    -0.096                    -0.074    
                                            (0.480)                   (0.151)                   (0.171)    
Groom Class Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Departement Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Linear Time Trend                  Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
 
R-Squared                        0.232        0.239        0.270        0.272        0.226        0.232    
Observations                      3208         3175         3080         3048         3208         3175  
 
Notes: The dependent variable for the first two columns is the class of the bride minus the class of the groom, where a 
higher value for class corresponds to a lower class.  The dependent variable for the third and fourth columns is a dummy 
variable that takes the value one if the bride was at least as high class as the groom.  The dependent variable for the 
last two columns is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bride was of low class (class 5, 6 or 7).  The sex 
ratio is defined as the number of men aged 18 to 59 divided by the number of women aged 15 to 49.  The omitted category 
for female occupations is workers.  Excess foreign males is defined as the percentage of males who are foreign minus the 
percentage of females who are foreign.  Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in 
the variable sex ratio.  Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Table 6.3: Men marry up more when the sex ratio is lower, IV   
                          
Panel A: Stage 1 regressions with sex ratio as the dependent variable 
 
                                   (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)          (6)    
 
Military Mortality              -0.010***    -0.007***    -0.010***    -0.007***    -0.010***    -0.007*** 
                               (0.001)      (0.000)      (0.001)      (0.000)      (0.001)      (0.000)    
Rural                                        -0.000                    -0.000                    -0.000    
                                            (0.001)                   (0.001)                   (0.001)    
% Female Managers                             0.006***                  0.006***                  0.006*** 
                                            (0.001)                   (0.001)                   (0.001)    
% Female Employees                           -0.005**                  -0.005**                  -0.005**  
                                            (0.002)                   (0.002)                   (0.002)    
% Female Self-Employed                       -0.002                    -0.002                    -0.002    
                                            (0.002)                   (0.002)                   (0.002)    
% Female Unemployed                          -0.003**                  -0.003*                   -0.003**  
                                            (0.001)                   (0.001)                   (0.001)    
Excess Foreign Males                          0.021***                  0.022***                  0.021*** 
                                            (0.004)                   (0.004)                   (0.004)    
Groom's Age (/100)                            0.006                     0.005                     0.006    
                                            (0.005)                   (0.005)                   (0.005)    
Bride's Age (/100)                           -0.009*                   -0.009*                   -0.009*   
                                            (0.005)                   (0.005)                   (0.005)    
Groom Class Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Departement Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Linear Time Trend                  Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
 
R-Squared                        0.889        0.950        0.886        0.950        0.889        0.950    
Observations                      3132         3099         3008         2976         3132         3099  
    
Notes: Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable sex ratio.  
Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
   
 
Panel B: Stage 2 regressions                           
 
Dependent variable: 
                            class diff   class diff   married up   married up    low bride    low bride    
 
Sex Ratio                        1.660***     2.685**     -0.599***    -0.822**      1.157***     1.849*** 
                               (0.626)      (1.132)      (0.216)      (0.393)      (0.295)      (0.446)    
Rural                                         0.193***                 -0.033                    -0.033    
                                            (0.070)                   (0.024)                   (0.026)    
% Female Managers                            -0.025                     0.003                    -0.012**  
                                            (0.016)                   (0.006)                   (0.006)    
% Female Employees                           -0.005                    -0.002                     0.001    
                                            (0.023)                   (0.007)                   (0.009)    
% Female Self-Employed                       -0.006                    -0.003                     0.001    
                                            (0.020)                   (0.006)                   (0.008)    
% Female Unemployed                           0.025                    -0.007                     0.019*** 
                                            (0.021)                   (0.006)                   (0.008)    
Excess Foreign Males                         -0.051                    -0.002                    -0.017    
                                            (0.065)                   (0.018)                   (0.019)    
Groom's Age (/100)                            0.323                     0.169                     0.138    
                                            (0.476)                   (0.149)                   (0.177)    
Bride's Age (/100)                           -0.534                    -0.103                    -0.062    
                                            (0.477)                   (0.149)                   (0.171)    
Groom Class Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Departement Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Linear Time Trend                  Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
 
R-Squared                        0.236        0.243        0.270        0.272        0.229        0.236    
Observations                      3132         3099         3008         2976         3132         3099 
    
Notes: These regressions use military mortality as a instrument for the sex ratio in IV regressions predicting bride 
class minus groom class, whether the groom married a bride of at least as high class as his own, or whether the bride was 
low class.  Panel A presents the stage 1 regressions, in which the dependent variable is the sex ratio.  The sex ratio is 
defined as the number of men aged 18 to 59 divided by the number of women aged 15 to 49.  Military mortality is the 
mortality rate of soldiers as a percentage of the male population aged 18 to 59 in 1911, and is zero for marriages that 
occurred before the war.  Panel B presents the stage 2 regressions, in which the dependent variable is the bride's class 
minus the groom's class for columns one and two, an indicator variable for the groom marrying a weakly higher class bride 
for the third and fourth columns, and an indicator variable for the bride being of low class (class 5, 6 or 7) for the 
last two columns.  The omitted category for female occupations is workers. Excess foreign males is defined as the 
percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign. Standard errors, given in 
parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable sex ratio. Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. 
 Figure 7.1: Pre-WWI matching was assortative according to age 
 
 
Note: For ease of presentation, the figure contains only marriages in which the bride was aged 15 to 49 and 
the groom was aged 18 to 59. This excludes 3.4% of pre-WWI marriages. 
 
















































 Table 7.1: Predicting bride's age minus groom's age, OLS 
          
Dependent variable: bride's age minus groom's age 
                                       (1)            (2)            (3)            (4)            (5)            (6)    
 
Military Mortality                   0.106***       0.112***                                                             
                                   (0.019)        (0.021)                                                                
Mortality, Grooms 21 & younger                                     0.101*                                                
                                                                 (0.054)                                                 
Mortality, Grooms 22 to 24                                         0.104***                                              
                                                                 (0.022)                                                 
Mortality, Grooms 25 to 27                                         0.141***                                              
                                                                 (0.027)                                                 
Mortality, Grooms 28 to 30                                         0.114***                                              
                                                                 (0.029)                                                 
Mortality, Grooms 31 to 33                                         0.086**                                               
                                                                 (0.035)                                                 
Mortality, Grooms 34 to 44                                         0.092*                                                
                                                                 (0.048)                                                 
Mortality, Grooms 45 & older                                       0.081                                                 
                                                                 (0.072)                                                 
Sex Ratio                                                                        -6.693***      -6.970***                
                                                                                (2.203)        (2.306)                   
Sex Ratio, Grooms 21 & younger                                                                                 -6.607    
                                                                                                              (4.037)    
Sex Ratio, Grooms 22 to 24                                                                                     -5.073**  
                                                                                                              (2.510)    
Sex Ratio, Grooms 25 to 27                                                                                     -9.885*** 
                                                                                                              (2.560)    
Sex Ratio, Grooms 28 to 30                                                                                     -8.726*** 
                                                                                                              (2.398)    
Sex Ratio, Grooms 31 to 33                                                                                     -7.749*   
                                                                                                              (3.991)    
Sex Ratio, Grooms 34 to 44                                                                                     -2.751    
                                                                                                              (3.809)    
Sex Ratio, Grooms 45 & older                                                                                   -6.075    
                                                                                                              (6.045)    
Grooms 22 to 24 yrs                 -1.982***      -1.939***      -1.964***      -1.993***      -1.959***      -3.518    
                                   (0.262)        (0.240)        (0.631)        (0.200)        (0.203)        (3.137)    
Grooms 25 to 27 yrs                 -3.571***      -3.503***      -3.810***      -3.542***      -3.475***      -0.129    
                                   (0.376)        (0.353)        (0.721)        (0.237)        (0.236)        (2.771)    
Grooms 28 to 30 yrs                 -4.813***      -4.735***      -4.847***      -4.779***      -4.702***      -2.564    
                                   (0.411)        (0.388)        (0.842)        (0.279)        (0.278)        (3.591)    
Grooms 31 to 33 yrs                 -6.222***      -6.141***      -6.048***      -6.274***      -6.191***      -5.043    
                                   (0.329)        (0.317)        (0.701)        (0.351)        (0.338)        (3.561)    
Grooms 34 to 44 yrs                 -7.689***      -7.580***      -7.526***      -7.599***      -7.486***     -11.364*** 
                                   (0.418)        (0.399)        (0.914)        (0.326)        (0.324)        (4.022)    
Grooms 45+ yrs                     -11.529***     -11.451***     -11.316***     -11.459***     -11.366***     -11.901*   
                                   (0.441)        (0.422)        (0.626)        (0.485)        (0.490)        (6.701)    
Rural                               -0.600***      -0.445***      -0.444***      -0.537***      -0.383**       -0.377**  
                                   (0.154)        (0.126)        (0.127)        (0.163)        (0.173)        (0.170)    
Excess Foreign Males                -0.222**       -0.235***      -0.242***      -0.121         -0.129         -0.135    
                                   (0.087)        (0.080)        (0.080)        (0.186)        (0.184)        (0.183)    
% Females 20-29                      0.288***       0.321***       0.343***       0.294          0.328          0.318    
                                   (0.093)        (0.089)        (0.095)        (0.303)        (0.306)        (0.305)    
% Females 30-39                      0.464***       0.517***       0.536***       0.279          0.322          0.339    
                                   (0.078)        (0.079)        (0.083)        (0.224)        (0.227)        (0.226)    
% Females 40-49                      0.135          0.180*         0.208**        0.056          0.102          0.105    
                                   (0.103)        (0.098)        (0.098)        (0.279)        (0.281)        (0.283)    
Groom Class Dummies                     No            Yes            Yes             No            Yes            Yes    
Bride Class Dummies                     No            Yes            Yes             No            Yes            Yes    
Departement Dummies                    Yes            Yes            Yes            Yes            Yes            Yes    
Linear Time Trend                      Yes            Yes            Yes            Yes            Yes            Yes    
 
R-Squared                            0.265          0.270          0.270          0.259          0.265          0.266    
Observations                          5832           5832           5832           6067           6067           6067 
    
Notes: The dependent variable is the age of the bride minus the age of the groom.  Military mortality is the mortality rate of 
soldiers as a percentage of the male population aged 18 to 59 in 1911, and is zero for marriages that occurred before the war.  Sex 
ratio is defined as the number of men aged 18 to 59 divided by the number of women aged 15 to 49.  The omitted category for groom 
age is 21 and younger.  Excess foreign males is defined as the percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females 
who are foreign.  The female population age groups are calculated as percentages of the female population aged 15 to 49.  The 
omitted category is age 15 to 19.  Pre-war marriages take the female age distribution from 1911; post-war marriages take the female 
age distribution from 1921.  Female occupation distribution controls are the percentages of the female labour force who are: 
managers, employees, workers, self-employed and unemployed.  Class dummies include, for bride and groom, six dummies for actual 
class (omitting one class), a "no occupation" dummy, and an "other missing" dummy.  Standard errors, given in parentheses, are 









 Table 7.2: Predicting bride's age minus groom's age, IV 
          
Panel A: Stage 1 regressions with negative sex ratio as the dependent variable 
 
                                                 (1)                  (2)                  (3)    
 
Military Mortality                            -0.007***            -0.007***                   
                                             (0.001)              (0.001)                      
Grooms 22 to 24 yrs                            0.001                0.001                      
                                             (0.001)              (0.001)                      
Grooms 25 to 27 yrs                            0.001                0.001                      
                                             (0.001)              (0.001)                      
Grooms 28 to 30 yrs                            0.001                0.002                      
                                             (0.001)              (0.001)                      
Grooms 31 to 33 yrs                            0.001                0.001                      
                                             (0.001)              (0.001)                      
Grooms 34 to 44 yrs                            0.001                0.001                      
                                             (0.001)              (0.001)                      
Grooms 45+ yrs                                 0.001                0.001                      
                                             (0.001)              (0.001)                 not                
Rural                                         -0.000                0.000              presented  
                                             (0.001)              (0.001)                      
Excess Foreign Males                           0.020***             0.020***                   
                                             (0.002)              (0.002)                      
% Females 20-29                                0.039***             0.039***                   
                                             (0.009)              (0.009)                      
% Females 30-39                                0.009                0.009                      
                                             (0.006)              (0.006)                      
% Females 40-49                                0.004                0.004                      
                                             (0.009)              (0.009)                      
Groom Class Dummies                               No                  Yes                      
Bride Class Dummies                               No                  Yes                      
Departement Dummies                              Yes                  Yes                      
Linear Time Trend                                Yes                  Yes                      
 
R-Squared                                      0.934                0.934                      
Observations                                    5802                 5802 
 
Notes: Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the 
variable sex ratio. Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
 Panel B: Stage 2 regressions with dependent variable bride's age minus groom's age 
 
                                                 (1)                  (2)                  (3)    
 
Sex Ratio                                    -18.839***           -19.942***                      
                                             (3.888)              (4.045)                         
Sex Ratio, Grooms 21 and younger                                                       -14.174    
                                                                                      (12.866)    
Sex Ratio, Grooms 22 to 24                                                             -18.557*** 
                                                                                       (5.764)    
Sex Ratio, Grooms 25 to 27                                                             -25.955*** 
                                                                                       (5.912)    
Sex Ratio, Grooms 28 to 30                                                             -18.784*** 
                                                                                       (5.438)    
Sex Ratio, Grooms 31 to 33                                                             -13.416    
                                                                                       (8.526)    
Sex Ratio, Grooms 34 to 44                                                             -14.708    
                                                                                      (11.152)    
Sex Ratio, Grooms 45 and older                                                          -9.454    
                                                                                      (27.910)    
Grooms 22 to 24 yrs                           -1.959***            -1.914***             2.511    
                                             (0.203)              (0.206)             (14.111)    
Grooms 25 to 27 yrs                           -3.557***            -3.489***             8.487    
                                             (0.245)              (0.244)             (14.479)    
Grooms 28 to 30 yrs                           -4.783***            -4.704***            -0.053    
                                             (0.287)              (0.285)             (14.276)    
Grooms 31 to 33 yrs                           -6.219***            -6.138***            -6.895    
                                             (0.354)              (0.338)             (14.484)    
Grooms 34 to 44 yrs                           -7.690***            -7.580***            -7.015    
                                             (0.332)              (0.328)             (16.986)    
Grooms 45+ yrs                               -11.483***           -11.405***           -16.095    
                                             (0.491)              (0.494)             (31.080)    
Rural                                         -0.599***            -0.435**             -0.429**  
                                             (0.162)              (0.173)              (0.169)    
Excess Foreign Males                           0.238                0.253                0.228    
                                             (0.170)              (0.169)              (0.174)    
% Females 20-29                                0.743**              0.829***             0.861**  
                                             (0.313)              (0.322)              (0.361)    
% Females 30-39                                0.742***             0.808***             0.835*** 
                                             (0.242)              (0.253)              (0.268)    
% Females 40-49                                0.338                0.393                0.439    
                                             (0.265)              (0.276)              (0.316)    
Groom Class Dummies                               No                  Yes                  Yes    
Bride Class Dummies                               No                  Yes                  Yes    
Departement Dummies                              Yes                  Yes                  Yes    
Linear Time Trend                                Yes                  Yes                  Yes    
 
R-Squared                                      0.263                0.268                0.267    
Observations                                    5802                 5802                 5802    
 
Notes: These regressions use military mortality as a instrument for the sex ratio in IV regressions predicting 
the age of the bride minus the age of the groom. Panel A presents the stage 1 regressions, in which the dependent 
variable is the sex ratio. The sex ratio is defined as the number of men aged 18 to 59 divided by the number of 
women aged 15 to 49.  The instrument, military mortality, is the mortality rate of soldiers as a percentage of 
the male population aged 18 to 59 in 1911, and is zero for marriages that occurred before the war.  Panel B 
presents the stage 2 regressions, in which the dependent variable is the bride's age minus the groom's age.  The 
stage 1 regressions for specification 3, in which there are seven instruments, are not presented.  The omitted 
category for groom age is 21 and younger.  Excess foreign males is defined as the percentage of males who are 
foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign.  The female population age groups are calculated as 
percentages of the female population aged 15 to 49.  The omitted category is age 15 to 19.  Pre-war marriages 
take the female age distribution from 1911; post-war marriages take the female age distribution from 1921.  
Female occupation distribution controls are the percentages of the female labour force who are: managers, 
employees, workers, self-employed and unemployed.  Class dummies include, for bride and groom, six dummies for 
actual class (omitting one class), a "no occupation" dummy, and an "other missing" dummy.  Standard errors, given 
in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the sex ratio.  Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
 Table A1: Men marry up more where military mortality was higher, OLS, years 1909 to 1923 
                          
Dependent variable: 
                            class diff   class diff   married up   married up    low bride    low bride    
 
Military Mortality              -0.025***    -0.026***     0.008***     0.009***    -0.016***    -0.016*** 
                               (0.005)      (0.006)      (0.002)      (0.002)      (0.002)      (0.003)    
Rural                                         0.263***                 -0.055**                  -0.011    
                                            (0.072)                   (0.023)                   (0.026)    
% Female Managers                            -0.001                    -0.012***                  0.001    
                                            (0.013)                   (0.004)                   (0.005)    
% Female Employees                           -0.044***                  0.004                    -0.014**  
                                            (0.014)                   (0.006)                   (0.006)    
% Female Self-Employed                       -0.021*                   -0.013***                  0.008*   
                                            (0.012)                   (0.004)                   (0.004)    
% Female Unemployed                           0.060**                  -0.032***                  0.043*** 
                                            (0.023)                   (0.008)                   (0.009)    
Excess Foreign Males                         -0.054                    -0.026                     0.037**  
                                            (0.059)                   (0.018)                   (0.017)    
Groom's Age (/100)                            0.375                     0.131                     0.071    
                                            (0.567)                   (0.180)                   (0.174)    
Bride's Age (/100)                           -0.215                    -0.209                     0.110    
                                            (0.519)                   (0.169)                   (0.190)    
Groom Class Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Departement Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Linear Time Trend                  Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
 
R-Squared                        0.246        0.250        0.288        0.291        0.241        0.241    
Observations                      2248         2212         2156         2122         2248         2212     
 
Notes: The dependent variable for the first two columns is the class of the bride minus the class of the groom, where a 
higher value for class corresponds to a lower class.  The dependent variable for the third and fourth columns is a dummy 
variable that takes the value one if the bride was at least as high class as the groom.  The dependent variable for the 
last two columns is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bride was of low class (class 5, 6 or 7).  Military 
mortality is the mortality rate of soldiers as a percentage of the male population aged 18 to 59 in 1911, and is zero for 
marriages that occurred before the war.  The omitted category for female occupations is workers.  Excess foreign males is 
defined as the percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign.  Standard errors, 
given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable military mortality.  Asterisks indicate: * 




Table A2: Men marry up more when the sex ratio is lower, OLS, years 1909 to 1923 
                          
Dependent variable: 
                            class diff   class diff   married up   married up    low bride    low bride    
 
Sex Ratio                        2.059*       2.496***    -0.934***    -0.809**      1.531***     1.638*** 
                               (1.053)      (0.940)      (0.335)      (0.332)      (0.352)      (0.369)    
Rural                                         0.284***                 -0.063**                  -0.001    
                                            (0.084)                   (0.029)                   (0.032)    
% Female Managers                            -0.011                    -0.009                    -0.005    
                                            (0.018)                   (0.006)                   (0.007)    
% Female Employees                           -0.025                    -0.002                    -0.001    
                                            (0.023)                   (0.008)                   (0.010)    
% Female Self-Employed                       -0.025                    -0.012                     0.005    
                                            (0.020)                   (0.007)                   (0.008)    
% Female Unemployed                           0.042                    -0.027**                   0.031*   
                                            (0.042)                   (0.012)                   (0.018)    
Excess Foreign Males                         -0.132                     0.000                    -0.015    
                                            (0.084)                   (0.027)                   (0.027)    
Groom's Age (/100)                            0.201                     0.164                     0.023    
                                            (0.593)                   (0.198)                   (0.194)    
Bride's Age (/100)                           -0.192                    -0.208                     0.100    
                                            (0.532)                   (0.181)                   (0.175)    
Groom Class Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Departement Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Linear Time Trend                  Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
 
R-Squared                        0.239        0.248        0.287        0.290        0.236        0.239    
Observations                      2270         2260         2177         2168         2270         2260    
  
Notes: The dependent variable for the first two columns is the class of the bride minus the class of the groom, where a 
higher value for class corresponds to a lower class.  The dependent variable for the third and fourth columns is a dummy 
variable that takes the value one if the bride was at least as high class as the groom.  The dependent variable for the 
last two columns is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bride was of low class (class 5, 6 or 7).  The sex 
ratio is defined as the number of men aged 18 to 59 divided by the number of women aged 15 to 49.  The omitted category 
for female occupations is workers.  Excess foreign males is defined as the percentage of males who are foreign minus the 
percentage of females who are foreign.  Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in 
the variable sex ratio.  Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Appendix A: Short sample
APPENDICES FOR REFEREES AND NOT NECESSARILY FOR PUBLICATIONTable A3: Men marry up more when the sex ratio is lower, IV, years 1909 to 1923   
                          
Panel A: Stage 1 regressions with sex ratio as the dependent variable 
 
                                   (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)          (6)    
 
Military Mortality              -0.006***    -0.006***    -0.006***    -0.006***    -0.006***    -0.006*** 
                               (0.000)      (0.000)      (0.000)      (0.000)      (0.000)      (0.000)    
Rural                                        -0.001                    -0.001                    -0.001    
                                            (0.001)                   (0.001)                   (0.001)    
% Female Managers                             0.003*                    0.003*                    0.003*   
                                            (0.002)                   (0.002)                   (0.002)    
% Female Employees                           -0.008**                  -0.008**                  -0.008**  
                                            (0.004)                   (0.004)                   (0.004)    
% Female Self-Employed                        0.002                     0.002                     0.002    
                                            (0.002)                   (0.002)                   (0.002)    
% Female Unemployed                           0.011**                   0.011**                   0.011**  
                                            (0.005)                   (0.005)                   (0.005)    
Excess Foreign Males                          0.032***                  0.032***                  0.032*** 
                                            (0.005)                   (0.006)                   (0.005)    
Groom's Age (/100)                            0.002                     0.001                     0.002    
                                            (0.003)                   (0.003)                   (0.003)    
Bride's Age (/100)                            0.002                     0.001                     0.002    
                                            (0.004)                   (0.005)                   (0.004)    
Groom Class Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Departement Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Linear Time Trend                  Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
 
R-Squared                        0.941        0.964        0.940        0.964        0.941        0.964    
Observations                      2222         2212         2131         2122         2222         2212   
    
Notes: Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable sex ratio.  
Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
   
 
Panel B: Stage 2 regressions                           
 
Dependent variable: 
                            class diff   class diff   married up   married up    low bride    low bride    
 
Sex Ratio                        4.710***     4.139***    -1.586***    -1.495***     2.990***     2.614*** 
                               (1.258)      (1.425)      (0.471)      (0.480)      (0.548)      (0.607)    
Rural                                         0.265***                 -0.056*                   -0.009    
                                            (0.082)                   (0.029)                   (0.032)    
% Female Managers                            -0.014                    -0.008                    -0.007    
                                            (0.018)                   (0.006)                   (0.007)    
% Female Employees                           -0.010                    -0.008                     0.008    
                                            (0.024)                   (0.008)                   (0.011)    
% Female Self-Employed                       -0.028                    -0.010                     0.004    
                                            (0.020)                   (0.007)                   (0.008)    
% Female Unemployed                           0.015                    -0.016                     0.015    
                                            (0.043)                   (0.012)                   (0.019)    
Excess Foreign Males                         -0.186*                    0.022                    -0.046    
                                            (0.097)                   (0.032)                   (0.032)    
Groom's Age (/100)                            0.366                     0.133                     0.066    
                                            (0.590)                   (0.195)                   (0.191)    
Bride's Age (/100)                           -0.221                    -0.208                     0.106    
                                            (0.530)                   (0.178)                   (0.176)    
Groom Class Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Departement Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Linear Time Trend                  Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
 
R-Squared                        0.238        0.249        0.287        0.290        0.231        0.238    
Observations                      2222         2212         2131         2122         2222         2212 
    
Notes: These regressions use military mortality as a instrument for the sex ratio in IV regressions predicting bride 
class minus groom class, whether the groom married a bride of at least as high class as his own, or whether the bride was 
low class.  Panel A presents the stage 1 regressions, in which the dependent variable is the sex ratio.  The sex ratio is 
defined as the number of men aged 18 to 59 divided by the number of women aged 15 to 49.  Military mortality is the 
mortality rate of soldiers as a percentage of the male population aged 18 to 59 in 1911, and is zero for marriages that 
occurred before the war.  Panel B presents the stage 2 regressions, in which the dependent variable is the bride's class 
minus the groom's class for columns one and two, an indicator variable for the groom marrying a weakly higher class bride 
for the third and fourth columns, and an indicator variable for the bride being of low class (class 5, 6 or 7) for the 
last two columns.  The omitted category for female occupations is workers. Excess foreign males is defined as the 
percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign. Standard errors, given in 
parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable sex ratio.  Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. 
 
 Table B1: Men marry up more where military mortality was higher, OLS, defining class as the class of the 
father 
                          
Dependent variable: 
                            class diff   class diff   married up   married up    low bride    low bride    
 
Military Mortality              -0.009        0.000        0.007***     0.007***    -0.007**     -0.003    
                               (0.008)      (0.009)      (0.002)      (0.002)      (0.003)      (0.003)    
Rural                                         0.152*                   -0.014                    -0.098*** 
                                            (0.090)                   (0.027)                   (0.029)    
% Male Managers                               0.011                    -0.021***                  0.001    
                                            (0.013)                   (0.004)                   (0.004)    
% Male Employees                              0.012                    -0.024***                  0.001    
                                            (0.018)                   (0.004)                   (0.006)    
% Male Self-Employed                          0.020                    -0.006                     0.010*   
                                            (0.015)                   (0.005)                   (0.005)    
% Male Unemployed                            -0.004                    -0.003                     0.006    
                                            (0.020)                   (0.005)                   (0.006)    
Excess Foreign Males                         -0.013                     0.001                     0.008    
                                            (0.036)                   (0.012)                   (0.010)    
Groom's Age (/100)                           -0.292                     0.411**                  -0.502**  
                                            (0.583)                   (0.201)                   (0.206)    
Bride's Age (/100)                           -2.439***                  0.081                    -0.570**  
                                            (0.813)                   (0.200)                   (0.276)    
Groom Class Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Departement Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Linear Time Trend                  Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
 
R-Squared                        0.202        0.213        0.280        0.285        0.202        0.219    
Observations                      2034         1966         1944         1882         2034         1966    
 
Notes: The dependent variable for the first two columns is the class of the bride minus the class of the groom, where a 
higher value for class corresponds to a lower class.  The dependent variable for the third and fourth columns is a dummy 
variable that takes the value one if the bride was at least as high class as the groom.  The dependent variable for the 
last two columns is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bride was of low class (class 5, 6 or 7).  Military 
mortality is the mortality rate of soldiers as a percentage of the male population aged 18 to 59 in 1911, and is zero for 
marriages that occurred before the war.  The omitted category for male occupations is workers.  Excess foreign males is 
defined as the percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign.  Standard errors, 
given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable military mortality.  Asterisks indicate: * 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
Table B2: Men marry up more when the sex ratio is lower, OLS, defining class as the class of the father 
                          
Dependent variable: 
                            class diff   class diff   married up   married up    low bride    low bride    
 
Sex Ratio                        0.888       -0.678       -0.683***    -0.651*       0.432*      -0.245    
                               (0.679)      (1.221)      (0.192)      (0.343)      (0.243)      (0.399)    
Rural                                         0.161*                   -0.013                    -0.090*** 
                                            (0.089)                   (0.026)                   (0.027)    
% Male Managers                              -0.022                    -0.008                    -0.004    
                                            (0.028)                   (0.008)                   (0.009)    
% Male Employees                              0.000                     0.001                     0.002    
                                            (0.037)                   (0.010)                   (0.011)    
% Male Self-Employed                          0.011                    -0.006                     0.008    
                                            (0.022)                   (0.008)                   (0.008)    
% Male Unemployed                            -0.068**                   0.000                    -0.019    
                                            (0.030)                   (0.009)                   (0.011)    
Excess Foreign Males                         -0.023                     0.004                     0.022    
                                            (0.057)                   (0.018)                   (0.019)    
Groom's Age (/100)                           -0.629                     0.613**                  -0.546**  
                                            (0.818)                   (0.267)                   (0.218)    
Bride's Age (/100)                           -1.938**                   0.009                    -0.483**  
                                            (0.886)                   (0.258)                   (0.216)    
Groom Class Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Departement Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Linear Time Trend                  Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
 
R-Squared                        0.200        0.210        0.283        0.288        0.202        0.219    
Observations                      2109         2088         2014         1994         2109         2088 
  
Notes: The dependent variable for the first two columns is the class of the bride minus the class of the groom, where a 
higher value for class corresponds to a lower class.  The dependent variable for the third and fourth columns is a dummy 
variable that takes the value one if the bride was at least as high class as the groom.  The dependent variable for the 
last two columns is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bride was of low class (class 5, 6 or 7).  The sex 
ratio is defined as the number of men aged 18 to 59 divided by the number of women aged 15 to 49.  The omitted category 
for male occupations is workers.  Excess foreign males is defined as the percentage of males who are foreign minus the 
percentage of females who are foreign.  Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in 
the variable sex ratio.  Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Appendix B: Fathers' classesTable B3: Men marry up more when the sex ratio is lower, IV, defining class as the class of the father   
                          
Panel A: Stage 1 regressions with sex ratio as the dependent variable 
 
                                   (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)          (6)    
 
Military Mortality              -0.009***    -0.006***    -0.009***    -0.006***    -0.009***    -0.006*** 
                               (0.001)      (0.001)      (0.001)      (0.001)      (0.001)      (0.001)    
Rural                                         0.001                     0.001                     0.001    
                                            (0.001)                   (0.001)                   (0.001)    
% Male Managers                              -0.002                    -0.002                    -0.002    
                                            (0.002)                   (0.002)                   (0.002)    
% Male Employees                              0.016***                  0.017***                  0.016*** 
                                            (0.002)                   (0.003)                   (0.002)    
% Male Self-Employed                          0.006***                  0.006***                  0.006*** 
                                            (0.001)                   (0.001)                   (0.001)    
% Male Unemployed                            -0.015***                 -0.015***                 -0.015*** 
                                            (0.002)                   (0.001)                   (0.002)    
Excess Foreign Males                          0.019***                  0.019***                  0.019*** 
                                            (0.003)                   (0.003)                   (0.003)    
Groom's Age (/100)                            0.004                     0.004                     0.004    
                                            (0.010)                   (0.010)                   (0.010)    
Bride's Age (/100)                            0.004                     0.005                     0.004    
                                            (0.009)                   (0.010)                   (0.009)    
Groom Class Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Departement Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Linear Time Trend                  Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
 
R-Squared                        0.885        0.950        0.886        0.952        0.885        0.950    
Observations                      1972         1951         1887         1867         1972         1951  
    
Notes: Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable sex ratio.  
Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
   
 
Panel B: Stage 2 regressions                           
 
Dependent variable: 
                            class diff   class diff   married up   married up    low bride    low bride    
 
Sex Ratio                        1.029       -0.654       -0.767***    -1.103*       0.719**      0.189    
                               (0.981)      (1.980)      (0.292)      (0.606)      (0.321)      (0.661)    
Rural                                         0.172**                  -0.019                    -0.095*** 
                                            (0.082)                   (0.026)                   (0.027)    
% Male Managers                              -0.023                    -0.011                    -0.002    
                                            (0.028)                   (0.008)                   (0.009)    
% Male Employees                             -0.004                     0.009                    -0.004    
                                            (0.044)                   (0.012)                   (0.014)    
% Male Self-Employed                          0.007                     0.004                     0.004    
                                            (0.027)                   (0.010)                   (0.011)    
% Male Unemployed                            -0.067*                   -0.006                    -0.010    
                                            (0.036)                   (0.012)                   (0.013)    
Excess Foreign Males                         -0.036                     0.022                     0.012    
                                            (0.074)                   (0.023)                   (0.025)    
Groom's Age (/100)                           -0.363                     0.456*                   -0.504**  
                                            (0.842)                   (0.265)                   (0.219)    
Bride's Age (/100)                           -2.408***                  0.094                    -0.556**  
                                            (0.878)                   (0.244)                   (0.219)    
Groom Class Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Departement Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Linear Time Trend                  Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
 
R-Squared                        0.205        0.217        0.280        0.284        0.201        0.219    
Observations                      1972         1951         1887         1867         1972         1951 
    
Notes: These regressions use military mortality as a instrument for the sex ratio in IV regressions predicting bride 
class minus groom class, whether the groom married a bride of at least as high class as his own, or whether the bride was 
low class.  Panel A presents the stage 1 regressions, in which the dependent variable is the sex ratio.  The sex ratio is 
defined as the number of men aged 18 to 59 divided by the number of women aged 15 to 49.  Military mortality is the 
mortality rate of soldiers as a percentage of the male population aged 18 to 59 in 1911, and is zero for marriages that 
occurred before the war.  Panel B presents the stage 2 regressions, in which the dependent variable is the bride's class 
minus the groom's class for columns one and two, an indicator variable for the groom marrying a weakly higher class bride 
for the third and fourth columns, and an indicator variable for the bride being of low class (class 5, 6 or 7) for the 
last two columns.  The omitted category for male occupations is workers. Excess foreign males is defined as the 
percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign. Standard errors, given in 
parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable sex ratio. Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. Appendix C: Variable definitions 
 
Dependent variables:  
 
Assortative matching by class (see class definition in section 4.1) 
Bride minus groom class:  This variable is the class of the bride minus the class of the groom, which 
is a marriage-level variable. 
Married up:  The variable the groom married up is a marriage-level dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 if the bride is in at least as high a class as the groom. 
Low bride class:  This is a marriage-level dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the bride is class 5, 
6 or 7.  That is, if she is a low-skilled or unskilled manual or farm worker. 
 
Assortative matching by age 
Bride minus groom’s age: This variable is the age of the bride minus the age of the groom, which is a 
marriage-level variable. 
 
Main independent variables: 
 
Military mortality: We use military mortality data from the French ministry of defense.
1 Military 
mortality is defined at the département-level as a percentage of the male population aged 18 to 59 in 
1911; we set its value to zero for marriages that occurred before WWI. 
Sex ratio:  The sex ratio is defined as the number of men aged 18 to 59 years divided by the number of 
women aged 15 to 49 years.  It is defined at the département level for each census period, namely 
1911, 1921 and 1926.  Thus marriages in the period 1909 to 1914 take the value from 1911, marriages 
in the period 1918 to 1923 take the value from 1921, and marriages in the period 1924 to 1928 take the 
value from 1926. 
 
Other control variables: 
 
Départements:  We use the 90 historical départements that existed at the end of WWI.  These 
départements include Moselle, Bas-Rhin and Haut-Rhin, which were gained from Germany in 1919.  
However, we do not have département-level data from the census for the pre-war period for these three 
départements, nor military mortality.  Consequently, because we include département dummies, 
observations from these three départements do not contribute to the estimation of the coefficients on 
military mortality or sex ratio. 
Female occupation variables (% managers, % employees, % unemployed, % self-employed):  In 
the censuses of 1906, 1921 and 1926, the female labor force is categorized into five groups: managers, 
employees, workers, unemployed and self-employed.  With workers as the omitted category, we use 
four variables for the percentage of the female labor force that falls into each of the other categories at 
the département level.  Marriages in the period 1909 to 1914 take the values from the 1906 census.  
Marriages in the period 1918 to 1923 take the values from the 1921 census.  Marriages in the period 
1924 to 1928 take the values from the 1921 census in regressions where the mortality rate and not the 
sex ratio is included as an explanatory variable, and take the values from the 1926 census in the IV 
regressions and the other regressions where the sex ratio and not the mortality rate is included as an 
explanatory variable. 
Male occupation variables (% managers, % employees, % unemployed, % self-employed):  
These variables are the male parallels of the female occupation variables. 
                                                 
1 Data and documentation are available at http://www.memoiredeshommes.sga.defense.gouv.fr/. Female population age groups (% Females 20-29, % Females 30-39, % Females 40-49): They are 
calculated at the département level as percentage of the female population aged 15-49. Women aged 
15 to 19 is the omitted category. Marriages in the period 1909 to 1914 take the values from the 1911 
census.  Marriages in the period 1918 to 1928 take the values from the 1921 census. 
Excess foreign males:  This variable is defined as foreign males as a percentage of total males minus 
foreign females as a percentage of total females at the département level.  We define as foreign all 
individuals classified by the census as foreign or naturalised French, regardless of their place of birth.  
Individuals classified as French by the census are considered to not be foreign, regardless of whether 
they were born in France or not. Marriages in the period 1909 to 1914 take the values from the 1911 
census.  Marriages in the period 1918 to 1923 take the values from the 1921 census.  Marriages in the 
period 1924 to 1928 take the values from the 1921 census in regressions where the mortality rate and 
not the sex ratio is included as an explanatory variable, and take the values from the 1926 census in the 
IV regressions and the other regressions where the sex ratio and not the mortality rate is included as an 
explanatory variable. 
Rural: This a dummy variable defined at the marriage level.  It is defined in terms of the 
administrative status of the place of marriage, which may take the values chef lieu de département, 
chef lieu d'arrondissement, chef-lieu de canton, and rural.  We consider the category rural to indicate a 
rural marriage, and the other three categories to indicate urban marriages. 
Groom’s age:  The age of the groom is constructed from three marriage-level variables: the age of the 
groom, the year of the marriage and the groom’s year of birth.  If the stated age of the groom falls in 
the range 10 to 89, this is the value used.  If it does not, or the age of the groom is missing, we use the 
difference between the year of marriage and the groom’s year of birth if this falls in the range 10 to 89.  
Otherwise the groom’s age is missing.   
Bride’s age: Same as groom’s age. 
 
 
 Table D1: Men marry up more where military mortality was higher, probit 
             
Dependent variable: 
                                       married up        married up         low bride         low bride    
 
Military Mortality                          0.008***          0.007***         -0.015***         -0.014*** 
                                          (0.003)           (0.002)           (0.004)           (0.003)    
Rural                                                        -0.042                              -0.045    
                                                            (0.026)                             (0.027)    
% Female Managers                                            -0.008**                             0.000    
                                                            (0.004)                             (0.005)    
% Female Employees                                            0.008*                             -0.023*** 
                                                            (0.004)                             (0.006)    
% Female Self-Employed                                       -0.013***                            0.005    
                                                            (0.004)                             (0.005)    
% Female Unemployed                                          -0.053***                            0.066*** 
                                                            (0.007)                             (0.009)    
Excess Foreign Males                                         -0.026*                              0.046*** 
                                                            (0.015)                             (0.015)    
Groom's Age (/100)                                            0.161                               0.187    
                                                            (0.155)                             (0.135)    
Bride's Age (/100)                                           -0.023                              -0.091    
                                                            (0.167)                             (0.220)    
Groom Class Dummies                           Yes               Yes               Yes               Yes    
Departement Dummies                           Yes               Yes               Yes               Yes    
Linear Time Trend                             Yes               Yes               Yes               Yes    
 
Observations                                 3000              2964              3103              3065    
 
Notes: The dependent variable for the first two columns is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bride was at 
least as high class as the groom.  The dependent variable for columns three and four is a dummy variable that takes the 
value one if the bride was of low class (class 5, 6 or 7).  Marginal effects are presented; the coefficients for the 
dummy variable rural are for a discrete change from 0 to 1.  Military mortality is the mortality rate of soldiers as a 
percentage of the male population aged 18 to 59 in 1911, and is zero for marriages that occurred before the war. The 
omitted category for female occupations is workers.  Excess foreign males is defined as the percentage of males who are 
foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign.  Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the 





Table D2: Men marry up more when the sex ratio is lower, probit                
 
Dependent variable: 
                                       married up        married up         low bride         low bride    
 
Sex Ratio                                  -0.573***         -0.901**           0.912***          1.761*** 
                                          (0.186)           (0.353)           (0.262)           (0.366)    
Rural                                                        -0.054*                             -0.036    
                                                            (0.031)                             (0.032)    
% Female Managers                                             0.003                              -0.012    
                                                            (0.008)                             (0.008)    
% Female Employees                                           -0.008                              -0.002    
                                                            (0.009)                             (0.011)    
% Female Self-Employed                                       -0.007                               0.002    
                                                            (0.007)                             (0.009)    
% Female Unemployed                                          -0.003                               0.023*** 
                                                            (0.007)                             (0.009)    
Excess Foreign Males                                         -0.001                               0.007    
                                                            (0.021)                             (0.025)    
Groom's Age (/100)                                            0.205                               0.121    
                                                            (0.188)                             (0.211)    
Bride's Age (/100)                                           -0.051                              -0.073    
                                                            (0.185)                             (0.200)    
Groom Class Dummies                           Yes               Yes               Yes               Yes    
Departement Dummies                           Yes               Yes               Yes               Yes    
Linear Time Trend                             Yes               Yes               Yes               Yes    
 
Observations                                 3050              3018              3156              3123   
 
Notes: The dependent variable for the first two columns is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bride was at 
least as high class as the groom.  The dependent variable for columns three and four is a dummy variable that takes the 
value one if the bride was of low class (class 5, 6 or 7).  Marginal effects are presented; the coefficients for the 
dummy variable rural are for a discrete change from 0 to 1.  Sex ratio is defined as the number of men aged 18 to 59 
divided by the number of women aged 15 to 49. The omitted category for female occupations is workers.  Excess foreign 
males is defined as the percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign.  Standard 
errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable sex ratio.  Asterisks indicate: * 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Appendix D: Probits and ordered probitsTable D3: Men marry up more where military mortality is higher or the sex ratio lower, ordered probit 
             
Dependent variable: bride's class 
                                              (1)               (2)               (3)               (4)    
 
Military Mortality                         -0.013**          -0.010*                                       
                                          (0.005)           (0.006)                                        
Sex Ratio                                                                       0.659*            1.212**  
                                                                              (0.354)           (0.599)    
Rural                                                         0.154***                            0.169*** 
                                                            (0.054)                             (0.060)    
% Female Managers                                            -0.005                              -0.010    
                                                            (0.007)                             (0.013)    
% Female Employees                                           -0.042***                           -0.005    
                                                            (0.008)                             (0.019)    
% Female Self-Employed                                       -0.018**                            -0.003    
                                                            (0.008)                             (0.016)    
% Female Unemployed                                           0.082***                            0.016    
                                                            (0.013)                             (0.017)    
Excess Foreign Males                                         -0.056                               0.003    
                                                            (0.036)                             (0.055)    
Groom's Age (/100)                                            0.272                               0.108    
                                                            (0.323)                             (0.413)    
Bride's Age (/100)                                           -0.482                              -0.421    
                                                            (0.374)                             (0.426)    
Groom Class Dummies                           Yes               Yes               Yes               Yes    
Departement Dummies                           Yes               Yes               Yes               Yes    
Linear Time Trend                             Yes               Yes               Yes               Yes    
 
Pseudo R-Squared                            0.083             0.084             0.080             0.082    
Observations                                 3158              3117              3208              3175    
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the class of the bride, where 1 is the highest class and 7 is the lowest.  Military 
mortality is the mortality rate of soldiers as a percentage of the male population aged 18 to 59 in 1911, and is zero for 
marriages that occurred before the war.  Sex ratio is defined as the number of men aged 18 to 59 divided by the number of 
women aged 15 to 49.  The omitted category for female occupations is workers.  Excess foreign males is defined as the 
percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign.  Standard errors, given in 
parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable military mortality in columns 1 and 2, and sex ratio 
in columns 3 and 4.  Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Table E1: The effect of mortality on marrying up by groom class, OLS 
                          
Dependent variable: 
                                 class diff  class diff  married up  married up   low bride   low bride    
 
Military Mortality, Class 1 Grooms   -0.016      -0.008       0.013       0.010      -0.005      -0.003    
                                    (0.029)     (0.029)     (0.009)     (0.009)     (0.011)     (0.010)    
Military Mortality, Class 2 Grooms   -0.034*     -0.032*      0.013*      0.012      -0.015**    -0.014**  
                                    (0.017)     (0.017)     (0.008)     (0.008)     (0.007)     (0.006)    
Military Mortality, Class 3 Grooms   -0.009      -0.006      -0.003      -0.004      -0.009***   -0.009*** 
                                    (0.007)     (0.007)     (0.004)     (0.004)     (0.003)     (0.003)    
Military Mortality, Class 4 Grooms   -0.015**    -0.010       0.006**     0.006*     -0.011***   -0.010*** 
                                    (0.007)     (0.008)     (0.003)     (0.003)     (0.003)     (0.004)    
Military Mortality, Class 5 Grooms   -0.019*     -0.018*      0.008***    0.008**    -0.009**    -0.010**  
                                    (0.010)     (0.010)     (0.003)     (0.003)     (0.004)     (0.004)    
Military Mortality, Class 6 Grooms   -0.016      -0.010       0.002       0.003      -0.013***   -0.012*** 
                                    (0.014)     (0.016)     (0.003)     (0.004)     (0.004)     (0.004)    
Military Mortality, Class 7 Grooms    0.001      -0.001                              -0.015***   -0.014*** 
                                    (0.017)     (0.018)                             (0.005)     (0.005)    
Other Controls                           No         Yes          No         Yes          No         Yes    
Groom Class Dummies                     Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes    
Departement Dummies                     Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes    
Linear Time Trend                       Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes    
 
R-Squared                             0.242       0.244       0.275       0.277       0.235       0.236    
Observations                           3158        3117        3033        2994        3158        3117    
 
Notes: The dependent variable for the first two columns is the class of the bride minus the class of the groom, where a 
higher value for class corresponds to a lower class.  The dependent variable for the third and fourth columns is a dummy 
variable that takes the value one if the bride was at least as high class as the groom.  The dependent variable for the 
last two columns is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bride was of low class (class 5, 6 or 7).  Military 
mortality is the mortality rate of soldiers as a percentage of the male population aged 18 to 59 in 1911, and is zero for 
marriages that occurred before the war.  "Military mortality, class 1 grooms" is the interaction of military mortality 
with a dummy for class 1 grooms, and similarly for the other classes.  The other controls are a dummy for a rural area, 
excess foreign males, the ages of the bride and groom, and the distribution of female occupations in the labour force. 
Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable military mortality.  






Table E2: The effect of sex ratio on marrying up by groom class, OLS 
                          
Dependent variable: 
                                 class diff  class diff  married up  married up   low bride   low bride    
 
Sex Ratio, Class 1 Grooms             3.859**     4.923***   -0.032      -0.284       1.810***    2.550*** 
                                    (1.824)     (1.847)     (0.622)     (0.653)     (0.591)     (0.540)    
Sex Ratio, Class 2 Grooms             2.169***    3.353***   -1.032***   -1.343***    0.916***    1.665*** 
                                    (0.816)     (1.029)     (0.292)     (0.422)     (0.325)     (0.399)    
Sex Ratio, Class 3 Grooms             0.577       1.653*     -0.483*     -0.765*      0.730***    1.463*** 
                                    (0.616)     (0.884)     (0.252)     (0.389)     (0.255)     (0.347)    
Sex Ratio, Class 4 Grooms             0.592       1.456*     -0.571*     -0.791**     0.807***    1.334*** 
                                    (0.674)     (0.853)     (0.309)     (0.371)     (0.290)     (0.342)    
Sex Ratio, Class 5 Grooms             1.108       2.138**    -0.247      -0.519       0.582*      1.271*** 
                                    (0.827)     (0.958)     (0.270)     (0.387)     (0.352)     (0.389)    
Sex Ratio, Class 6 Grooms            -1.582      -0.487       0.522**     0.232      -0.087       0.480    
                                    (1.467)     (1.508)     (0.241)     (0.323)     (0.493)     (0.473)    
Sex Ratio, Class 7 Grooms            -0.345       0.746                               0.299       0.964    
                                    (1.724)     (1.788)                             (0.593)     (0.588)    
Other Controls                           No         Yes          No         Yes          No         Yes      
Groom Class Dummies                     Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes    
Departement Dummies                     Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes    
Linear Time Trend                       Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes    
 
R-Squared                             0.235       0.242       0.273       0.275       0.229       0.234    
Observations                           3208        3175        3080        3048        3208        3175    
  
Notes: The sex ratio is defined as the number of men aged 18 to 59 divided by the number of women aged 15 to 49.  "Sex 
ratio, class 1 grooms" is the interaction of sex ratio with a dummy for class 1 grooms, and similarly for the other 
classes. The dependent variables and other controls are as in Table E1.  Standard errors, given in parentheses, are 
clustered at the level of variation in the variable sex ratio.  Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Appendix E: Differential effects by groom classAppendix F: Class Size and the magnitude of men’s social ascension 
 
In Section 6.3.3 we show that there is heterogeneity in the impact of the change in sex ratio 
on marriage outcome by class, with men in lowest classes benefiting the least and men in the high 
and middle classes benefiting the most. We investigate here whether this is simply the consequence 
of a mechanical effect due to different class sizes. To do so we consider an economy where (i) the 
sex ratio is initially equal to 1, (ii) men and women have vertical preferences regarding their 
spouse’s class, and (iii) the men and women’s distribution of classes are identical to those of 
married individuals in pre-WWI in France (see Table F1). 
We start by matching men and women according to their class. For example, in the 
economy there are 1.1 brides of class 1 and 5.5 grooms of class 1. This implies that out of these 5.5 
grooms, only 1.1 grooms can marry class 1 brides, while the remaining 4.4 class will marry class 2 
brides. This leaves only 5.2 class 2 brides to marry class 2 grooms. A large proportion of the class 2 
grooms will thus marry class 3 brides. We repeat this exercise in an inductive way. This allows us 
to obtain the average class of the bride for each groom’s class. The results are shown in the second 
column of Table F2.  
  We then consider a demographic shock that reduces uniformly across classes the number of 
men by 8.74%.
1 Thus, the economy has now a sex-ratio of 91.3%, implying that 8.74% of the 
women will remain single. We construct marriage outcomes using the same matching mechanism 
as above for the pre-shock period. The new averages of bride’s class are presented in the third 
column of Table F2. We can see that due to the shortage of men in higher classes, grooms in 
classes 5, 6 and 7 are now able to marry only brides of class 5. 
Finally, we compute the average gain for each groom’s class measured as the difference 
between the post-shock and pre-shock average class of the brides. The results are shown in column 
four of table F2. By construction, these gains are mechanically driven by the different sizes of men 
and women’s classes. We see that classes 6 and 7 those who benefit the most from the shock. This 
contrasts with the average gain implied by our estimates in Section 6.3.3 following a similar 
decrease in sex ratio and where in terms of magnitude, classes 1, 2 and 5 benefited the most from 
the change in sex ratio, while classes 6 and 7 benefit the least.  
  Thus we are led to conclude that that the mechanical effect due to differences in class sizes 
is unlikely to be the sole cause of the differential impact of a change in sex ratio across classes.  
 
Table F1: Distribution of classes in France 1909-1914 among married individuals 
Class Brides  Grooms    Class Brides  Grooms 
1 1.1  5.5    5 33.3  20.1 
2 9.6  17.9    6 6.4  5.4 
3 30.6  24.2    7 4.1  4.0 
4 14.9  23.0       
  














Average gain from 
estimation of Table E2 
(second column) 
1 1.79  1.77  0.02  2.80 2.60  0.43 
2 2.71  2.65  0.06  3.46 3.05  0.29 
3 3.26  3.09  0.16  3.89 3.73  0.14 
4 4.62  4.39  0.23  4.28 4.14  0.13 
5 5.05  5.00  0.05  4.35 4.14  0.19 
6 6.02  5.00  1.02  4.74 4.78  -0.04 
7 7.00  5.00  2.00  5.20 5.44  0.07 
                                                 
1 In France, the ratio of men aged 18 to 59 to women aged 15 to 49 decreased from 1,087 men per 1,000 women in 
1911 to 992 men per 1,000 women in 1921 (Huber, 1921), which, holding the number of women constant, implies a 
reduction of 8.74% of the men in age of getting married. Table G1: The effect of mortality on marrying up is similar in rural and urban areas, OLS 
                          
Dependent variable: 
                          class diff   class diff   married up   married up    low bride    low bride    
 
Urban Military Mortality      -0.015*      -0.013*       0.005*       0.004       -0.009**     -0.009*** 
                             (0.008)      (0.008)      (0.003)      (0.003)      (0.004)      (0.003)    
Rural Military Mortality      -0.016**     -0.012*       0.006***     0.005**     -0.012***    -0.011*** 
                             (0.006)      (0.007)      (0.002)      (0.002)      (0.003)      (0.003)    
Rural                          0.206***     0.175***    -0.031       -0.039*      -0.010       -0.024    
                             (0.045)      (0.045)      (0.022)      (0.021)      (0.019)      (0.019)    
% Female Managers                          -0.007                    -0.007**                   0.003    
                                          (0.008)                   (0.003)                   (0.003)    
% Female Employees                         -0.048***                  0.007**                  -0.016*** 
                                          (0.009)                   (0.004)                   (0.004)    
% Female Self-Employed                     -0.019*                   -0.013***                  0.006*   
                                          (0.010)                   (0.003)                   (0.003)    
% Female Unemployed                         0.098***                 -0.046***                  0.054*** 
                                          (0.016)                   (0.005)                   (0.006)    
Excess Foreign Males                       -0.051                    -0.025**                   0.035*** 
                                          (0.041)                   (0.011)                   (0.011)    
Groom's Age (/100)                          0.382                     0.159                     0.155    
                                          (0.339)                   (0.124)                   (0.111)    
Bride's Age (/100)                         -0.582                    -0.081                    -0.086    
                                          (0.416)                   (0.133)                   (0.188)    
Groom Class Dummies              Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Departement Dummies              Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Linear Time Trend                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
 
R-Squared                      0.243        0.243        0.271        0.273        0.235        0.236    
Observations                    3158         3117         3033         2994         3158         3117    
 
Notes: The dependent variable for the first two columns is the class of the bride minus the class of the groom, where a 
higher value for class corresponds to a lower class.  The dependent variable for the third and fourth columns is a dummy 
variable that takes the value one if the bride was at least as high class as the groom.  The dependent variable for the 
last two columns is a dummy variable for the bride being low class (class 5, 6 or 7). Military mortality is the mortality 
rate of soldiers as a percentage of the male population aged 18 to 59 in 1911, and is zero for marriages that occurred 
before the war.  Urban military mortality is an urban dummy interacted with military mortality; rural military mortality 
is a rural dummy interacted with military mortality.  Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level 
of variation in the variable military mortality.  Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
Table G2: The effect of sex ratio on marrying up is similar in rural and urban areas, OLS 
                          
Dependent variable: 
                          class diff   class diff   married up   married up    low bride    low bride    
 
Urban Sex Ratio                0.749        1.728*      -0.450**     -0.706*       0.475**      1.111*** 
                             (0.525)      (0.944)      (0.190)      (0.367)      (0.230)      (0.369)    
Rural Sex Ratio                0.979*       1.592**     -0.455**     -0.635**      0.973***     1.384*** 
                             (0.555)      (0.707)      (0.229)      (0.301)      (0.236)      (0.293)    
Rural                         -0.024        0.343       -0.035       -0.115       -0.533*      -0.306    
                             (0.739)      (0.851)      (0.289)      (0.335)      (0.304)      (0.337)    
% Female Managers                          -0.015                     0.002                    -0.008    
                                          (0.015)                   (0.006)                   (0.006)    
% Female Employees                         -0.006                    -0.005                    -0.001    
                                          (0.023)                   (0.007)                   (0.009)    
% Female Self-Employed                     -0.002                    -0.005                     0.002    
                                          (0.019)                   (0.006)                   (0.008)    
% Female Unemployed                         0.022                    -0.004                     0.016**  
                                          (0.022)                   (0.006)                   (0.008)    
Excess Foreign Males                        0.001                    -0.006                     0.010    
                                          (0.063)                   (0.016)                   (0.020)    
Groom's Age (/100)                          0.195                     0.193                     0.099    
                                          (0.481)                   (0.150)                   (0.180)    
Bride's Age (/100)                         -0.515                    -0.096                    -0.073    
                                          (0.479)                   (0.150)                   (0.171)    
Groom Class Dummies              Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Departement Dummies              Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Linear Time Trend                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
 
R-Squared                      0.235        0.239        0.271        0.272        0.228        0.232    
Observations                    3208         3175         3080         3048         3208         3175    
  
Notes: The sex ratio is defined as the number of men aged 18 to 59 divided by the number of women aged 15 to 49.  
Negative urban sex ratio is the negative of an urban dummy interacted with sex ratio; negative rural sex ratio is the 
negative of a rural dummy interacted with sex ratio.  The dependent variables are as in Table G1.  Standard errors, given 
in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable sex ratio.  Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 




Appendix H: Assigning classes to brides with missing classTable H1: Men marry up more where military mortality was higher, OLS, assigning father's class to brides 
with no occupation 
                          
Dependent variable: 
                            class diff   class diff   married up   married up    low bride    low bride    
 
Military Mortality              -0.010       -0.010        0.004*       0.004**     -0.008**     -0.009*** 
                               (0.007)      (0.006)      (0.002)      (0.002)      (0.003)      (0.003)    
Rural                                         0.134**                  -0.024                    -0.064*** 
                                            (0.054)                   (0.017)                   (0.016)    
% Female Managers                            -0.021***                  0.001                    -0.005*   
                                            (0.008)                   (0.003)                   (0.003)    
% Female Employees                           -0.033***                  0.008**                  -0.012*** 
                                            (0.011)                   (0.004)                   (0.004)    
% Female Self-Employed                       -0.003                    -0.004*                    0.004    
                                            (0.008)                   (0.002)                   (0.004)    
% Female Unemployed                           0.059***                 -0.022***                  0.034*** 
                                            (0.017)                   (0.004)                   (0.006)    
Excess Foreign Males                          0.095***                 -0.042***                  0.071*** 
                                            (0.025)                   (0.008)                   (0.009)    
Groom's Age (/100)                            0.306                     0.115                     0.009    
                                            (0.351)                   (0.144)                   (0.092)    
Bride's Age (/100)                           -0.474                    -0.121                     0.031    
                                            (0.394)                   (0.145)                   (0.143)    
Groom Class Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Departement Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Linear Time Trend                  Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
 
R-Squared                        0.227        0.230        0.238        0.238        0.203        0.209    
Observations                      4357         4281         4209         4136         4357         4281    
 
Notes: The dependent variable for the first two columns is the class of the bride minus the class of the groom, where a 
higher value for class corresponds to a lower class.  The dependent variable for the third and fourth columns is a dummy 
variable that takes the value one if the bride was at least as high class as the groom.  The dependent variable for the 
last two columns is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bride was of low class (class 5, 6 or 7).  Military 
mortality is the mortality rate of soldiers as a percentage of the male population aged 18 to 59 in 1911, and is zero for 
marriages that occurred before the war.  The omitted category for female occupations is workers.  Excess foreign males is 
defined as the percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign.  Standard errors, 
given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable military mortality.  Asterisks indicate: * 




Table H2: Men marry up more when the sex ratio is lower, OLS, assigning father's class to brides with no 
occupation 
                          
Dependent variable: 
                            class diff   class diff   married up   married up    low bride    low bride    
 
Sex Ratio                        0.260        0.655       -0.297**     -0.415*       0.430***     0.837*** 
                               (0.376)      (0.639)      (0.135)      (0.241)      (0.158)      (0.234)    
Rural                                         0.136**                  -0.026                    -0.059*** 
                                            (0.055)                   (0.018)                   (0.018)    
% Female Managers                            -0.014                     0.004                    -0.008    
                                            (0.014)                   (0.005)                   (0.005)    
% Female Employees                           -0.004                     0.000                     0.003    
                                            (0.018)                   (0.007)                   (0.007)    
% Female Self-Employed                        0.009                    -0.004                     0.005    
                                            (0.014)                   (0.005)                   (0.006)    
% Female Unemployed                           0.021                    -0.006                     0.013**  
                                            (0.018)                   (0.005)                   (0.006)    
Excess Foreign Males                          0.069                    -0.023*                    0.023    
                                            (0.043)                   (0.012)                   (0.015)    
Groom's Age (/100)                            0.182                     0.129                    -0.039    
                                            (0.458)                   (0.146)                   (0.154)    
Bride's Age (/100)                           -0.440                    -0.125                     0.044    
                                            (0.482)                   (0.149)                   (0.152)    
Groom Class Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Departement Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Linear Time Trend                  Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
 
R-Squared                        0.222        0.226        0.242        0.243        0.198        0.204    
Observations                      4443         4396         4289         4243         4443         4396     
  
Notes: The sex ratio is defined as the number of men aged 18 to 59 divided by the number of women aged 15 to 49. The 
dependent variables and other controls are as in Table H1.  Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the 
level of variation in the variable sex ratio.  Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 Table H3: Men marry up more when the sex ratio is lower, IV, assigning father's class to brides with no 
occupation   
                          
Panel A: Stage 1 regressions with sex ratio as the dependent variable 
 
                                   (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)          (6)    
 
Military Mortality              -0.010***    -0.007***    -0.010***    -0.007***    -0.010***    -0.007*** 
                               (0.001)      (0.000)      (0.001)      (0.000)      (0.001)      (0.000)    
Rural                                         0.000                     0.000                     0.000    
                                            (0.001)                   (0.001)                   (0.001)    
% Female Managers                             0.005***                  0.005***                  0.005*** 
                                            (0.001)                   (0.001)                   (0.001)    
% Female Employees                           -0.005**                  -0.005**                  -0.005**  
                                            (0.002)                   (0.002)                   (0.002)    
% Female Self-Employed                       -0.002                    -0.002                    -0.002    
                                            (0.002)                   (0.002)                   (0.002)    
% Female Unemployed                          -0.003**                  -0.003**                  -0.003**  
                                            (0.001)                   (0.001)                   (0.001)    
Excess Foreign Males                          0.021***                  0.021***                  0.021*** 
                                            (0.004)                   (0.004)                   (0.004)    
Groom's Age (/100)                            0.003                     0.001                     0.003    
                                            (0.005)                   (0.005)                   (0.005)    
Bride's Age (/100)                           -0.008                    -0.007                    -0.008    
                                            (0.005)                   (0.005)                   (0.005)    
Groom Class Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Departement Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Linear Time Trend                  Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
 
R-Squared                        0.888        0.942        0.887        0.941        0.888        0.942    
Observations                      4299         4252         4153         4107         4299         4252  
    
Notes: Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable sex ratio.  
Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
   
 
Panel B: Stage 2 regressions                           
 
Dependent variable: 
                            class diff   class diff   married up   married up    low bride    low bride    
 
Sex Ratio                        1.056*       2.057*      -0.463**     -0.713*       0.878***     1.513*** 
                               (0.601)      (1.068)      (0.217)      (0.374)      (0.258)      (0.393)    
Rural                                         0.137**                  -0.024                    -0.064*** 
                                            (0.056)                   (0.018)                   (0.018)    
% Female Managers                            -0.025*                    0.006                    -0.013**  
                                            (0.015)                   (0.006)                   (0.006)    
% Female Employees                           -0.001                     0.004                     0.004    
                                            (0.020)                   (0.006)                   (0.008)    
% Female Self-Employed                        0.009                    -0.001                     0.005    
                                            (0.016)                   (0.005)                   (0.006)    
% Female Unemployed                           0.030                    -0.011**                   0.018*** 
                                            (0.019)                   (0.005)                   (0.007)    
Excess Foreign Males                          0.024                    -0.016                     0.002    
                                            (0.048)                   (0.015)                   (0.016)    
Groom's Age (/100)                            0.274                     0.117                     0.006    
                                            (0.458)                   (0.147)                   (0.150)    
Bride's Age (/100)                           -0.452                    -0.135                     0.042    
                                            (0.478)                   (0.149)                   (0.149)    
Groom Class Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Departement Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Linear Time Trend                  Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
 
R-Squared                        0.226        0.230        0.237        0.238        0.200        0.206    
Observations                      4299         4252         4153         4107         4299         4252 
    
Notes: These regressions use military mortality as a instrument for the sex ratio in IV regressions predicting bride 
class minus groom class, whether the groom married a bride of at least as high class as his own, or whether the bride was 
low class.  Panel A presents the stage 1 regressions, in which the dependent variable is the sex ratio.  The sex ratio is 
defined as the number of men aged 18 to 59 divided by the number of women aged 15 to 49.  Military mortality is the 
mortality rate of soldiers as a percentage of the male population aged 18 to 59 in 1911, and is zero for marriages that 
occurred before the war.  Panel B presents the stage 2 regressions, in which the dependent variable is the bride's class 
minus the groom's class for columns one and two, an indicator variable for the groom marrying a weakly higher class bride 
for the third and fourth columns, and an indicator variable for the bride being of low class (class 5, 6 or 7) for the 
last two columns.  The omitted category for female occupations is workers. Excess foreign males is defined as the 
percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign. Standard errors, given in 
parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable sex ratio. Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. 
 Table H4: The imputation of bride class, OLS
Dependent variable: Bride's class
Coefficient Std. Error
Class 1 Father -0.815*** 0.230
Class 2 Father -0.560*** 0.131
Class 3 Father -0.109 0.119
Class 4 Father 0.192 0.139
Class 5 Father 0.303** 0.125
Class 6 Father 0.488*** 0.130
Class 7 Father 0.456 0.318
Class 1 Mother -0.502 0.347
Class 2 Mother -0.726*** 0.177
Class 3 Mother -0.646*** 0.149
Class 4 Mother 0.034 0.153
Class 5 Mother 0.238** 0.100
Class 6 Mother 0.551*** 0.151
Class 7 Mother -0.921 1.301
Father has missing occupation because he's dead 0.052 0.098
Mother has missing occupation because she's dead 0.032 0.090
Father has no Occupation -0.117 0.245
Mother has no Occupation -0.292*** 0.093
Rural 0.517*** 0.148
Rural Interacted With:
Class 1 Father 0.202 0.384
Class 2 Father -0.289 0.295
Class 3 Father -0.576** 0.227
Class 4 Father -0.287 0.192
Class 5 Father -0.234 0.216
Class 6 Father 0.103 0.334
Class 7 Father -0.241 0.364
Class 1 Mother 0.234 0.562
Class 2 Mother 0.202 0.398
Class 3 Mother 0.665** 0.329
Class 4 Mother -0.165 0.195
Class 5 Mother 0.141 0.159
Class 6 Mother 0.284 0.366
Class 7 Mother 1.538 1.317
Father has missing occupation because he's dead -0.174 0.164
Mother has missing occupation because she's dead 0.177 0.151
Father has no Occupation 1.153* 0.691
Mother has no Occupation -0.150 0.182
Paris -0.382*** 0.075
Big City -0.154 0.106
Medium Sized City 0.045 0.079
Bride's Age -0.068*** 0.016
Bride's Age Squared 0.098*** 0.024
Linear Time Trend -0.009** 0.004
Observations 3312
R-squared 0.1707
Notes: The omitted category for parent's class is missing class for unknown reason.  The omitted 
category for city size is small city or other area.  Asterisks indicate: * 10%, ** 5%, ***1%.Table H5: Men marry up more where military mortality was higher, OLS, imputing class for brides with 
missing class 
                          
Dependent variable: 
                            class diff   class diff   married up   married up    low bride    low bride    
 
Military Mortality              -0.009**     -0.009**      0.004***     0.005***    -0.008***    -0.008*** 
                               (0.004)      (0.004)      (0.002)      (0.002)      (0.002)      (0.001)    
Rural                                         0.302***                 -0.069***                  0.061*** 
                                            (0.034)                   (0.011)                   (0.017)    
% Female Managers                            -0.016***                  0.001                    -0.012*** 
                                            (0.004)                   (0.002)                   (0.002)    
% Female Employees                           -0.035***                  0.011***                 -0.015*** 
                                            (0.005)                   (0.002)                   (0.003)    
% Female Self-Employed                       -0.016***                  0.002                    -0.005**  
                                            (0.004)                   (0.002)                   (0.002)    
% Female Unemployed                           0.039***                 -0.015***                  0.022*** 
                                            (0.008)                   (0.003)                   (0.004)    
Excess Foreign Males                          0.029**                  -0.040***                  0.030*** 
                                            (0.014)                   (0.004)                   (0.007)    
Groom's Age (/100)                            0.340                     0.163                    -0.027    
                                            (0.212)                   (0.115)                   (0.082)    
Bride's Age (/100)                           -0.262                    -0.159                     0.063    
                                            (0.269)                   (0.116)                   (0.112)    
Groom Class Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Departement Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Linear Time Trend                  Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
 
R-Squared                        0.212        0.222        0.418        0.419        0.164        0.168    
Observations                      5593         5498         5408         5318         5593         5498 
 
Notes: The dependent variable for the first two columns is the class of the bride minus the class of the groom, where a 
higher value for class corresponds to a lower class.  The dependent variable for the third and fourth columns is a dummy 
variable that takes the value one if the bride was at least as high class as the groom.  The dependent variable for the 
last two columns is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bride was of low class (class 5, 6 or 7).  Military 
mortality is the mortality rate of soldiers as a percentage of the male population aged 18 to 59 in 1911, and is zero for 
marriages that occurred before the war.  The omitted category for female occupations is workers.  Excess foreign males is 
defined as the percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign.  Standard errors, 
given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable military mortality.  Asterisks indicate: * 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
Table H6: Men marry up more when the sex ratio is lower, OLS, imputing class for brides with missing class 
                          
Dependent variable: 
                            class diff   class diff   married up   married up    low bride    low bride    
 
Sex Ratio                        0.513**      0.772**     -0.305***    -0.290        0.430***     0.650*** 
                               (0.248)      (0.380)      (0.111)      (0.179)      (0.123)      (0.191)    
Rural                                         0.305***                 -0.069***                  0.060*** 
                                            (0.038)                   (0.014)                   (0.017)    
% Female Managers                            -0.014*                    0.002                    -0.009**  
                                            (0.008)                   (0.004)                   (0.004)    
% Female Employees                           -0.013                    -0.001                    -0.001    
                                            (0.011)                   (0.005)                   (0.006)    
% Female Self-Employed                       -0.003                    -0.003                     0.000    
                                            (0.008)                   (0.004)                   (0.005)    
% Female Unemployed                           0.014                    -0.000                     0.006    
                                            (0.010)                   (0.004)                   (0.005)    
Excess Foreign Males                          0.029                    -0.013                     0.012    
                                            (0.027)                   (0.010)                   (0.011)    
Groom's Age (/100)                            0.227                     0.178*                   -0.056    
                                            (0.268)                   (0.105)                   (0.121)    
Bride's Age (/100)                           -0.232                    -0.161                     0.031    
                                            (0.306)                   (0.114)                   (0.134)    
Groom Class Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Departement Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Linear Time Trend                  Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
 
R-Squared                        0.205        0.218        0.419        0.423        0.159        0.164    
Observations                      5729         5682         5532         5486         5729         5682    
  
Notes: The dependent variable for the first two columns is the class of the bride minus the class of the groom, where a 
higher value for class corresponds to a lower class.  The dependent variable for the third and fourth columns is a dummy 
variable that takes the value one if the bride was at least as high class as the groom.  The dependent variable for the 
last two columns is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bride was of low class (class 5, 6 or 7).  The sex 
ratio is defined as the number of men aged 18 to 59 divided by the number of women aged 15 to 49.  The omitted category 
for female occupations is workers.  Excess foreign males is defined as the percentage of males who are foreign minus the 
percentage of females who are foreign.  Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in 
the variable sex ratio.  Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Table H7: Men marry up more when the sex ratio is lower, IV, imputing class for brides with missing class   
                          
Panel A: Stage 1 regressions with sex ratio as the dependent variable 
 
                                   (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)          (6)    
 
Military Mortality              -0.009***    -0.007***    -0.009***    -0.007***    -0.009***    -0.007*** 
                               (0.001)      (0.000)      (0.001)      (0.001)      (0.001)      (0.000)    
Rural                                         0.000                     0.000                     0.000    
                                            (0.001)                   (0.001)                   (0.001)    
% Female Managers                             0.005***                  0.005***                  0.005*** 
                                            (0.001)                   (0.001)                   (0.001)    
% Female Employees                           -0.004**                  -0.004**                  -0.004**  
                                            (0.002)                   (0.002)                   (0.002)    
% Female Self-Employed                       -0.002                    -0.002                    -0.002    
                                            (0.002)                   (0.002)                   (0.002)    
% Female Unemployed                          -0.003***                 -0.003***                 -0.003*** 
                                            (0.001)                   (0.001)                   (0.001)    
Excess Foreign Males                          0.020***                  0.019***                  0.020*** 
                                            (0.004)                   (0.004)                   (0.004)    
Groom's Age (/100)                            0.003                     0.002                     0.003    
                                            (0.004)                   (0.004)                   (0.004)    
Bride's Age (/100)                           -0.008**                  -0.008*                   -0.008**  
                                            (0.004)                   (0.004)                   (0.004)    
Groom Class Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Departement Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Linear Time Trend                  Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
 
R-Squared                        0.883        0.936        0.881        0.935        0.883        0.936    
Observations                      5515         5468         5334         5288         5515         5468   
    
Notes: Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable sex 
ratio.  Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
   
 
Panel B: Stage 2 regressions                           
 
Dependent variable: 
                            class diff   class diff   married up   married up    low bride    low bride    
 
Sex Ratio                        1.018**      1.690**     -0.465***    -0.572**      0.852***     1.313*** 
                               (0.420)      (0.709)      (0.176)      (0.292)      (0.205)      (0.339)    
Rural                                         0.304***                 -0.069***                  0.062*** 
                                            (0.039)                   (0.014)                   (0.018)    
% Female Managers                            -0.021**                   0.004                    -0.014*** 
                                            (0.009)                   (0.004)                   (0.005)    
% Female Employees                           -0.009                     0.000                     0.002    
                                            (0.012)                   (0.005)                   (0.006)    
% Female Self-Employed                       -0.002                    -0.002                     0.001    
                                            (0.010)                   (0.004)                   (0.005)    
% Female Unemployed                           0.019*                   -0.004                     0.010*   
                                            (0.011)                   (0.004)                   (0.005)    
Excess Foreign Males                         -0.002                    -0.008                    -0.009    
                                            (0.030)                   (0.011)                   (0.011)    
Groom's Age (/100)                            0.310                     0.162                    -0.030    
                                            (0.271)                   (0.107)                   (0.122)    
Bride's Age (/100)                           -0.235                    -0.167                     0.070    
                                            (0.310)                   (0.114)                   (0.137)    
Groom Class Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Departement Dummies                Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
Linear Time Trend                  Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes    
 
R-Squared                        0.209        0.222        0.415        0.418        0.161        0.166    
Observations                      5515         5468         5334         5288         5515         5468 
    
Notes: These regressions use military mortality as a instrument for the sex ratio in IV regressions predicting bride 
class minus groom class, whether the groom married a bride of at least as high class as his own, or whether the bride was 
low class.  Panel A presents the stage 1 regressions, in which the dependent variable is the sex ratio.  The sex ratio is 
defined as the number of men aged 18 to 59 divided by the number of women aged 15 to 49.  Military mortality is the 
mortality rate of soldiers as a percentage of the male population aged 18 to 59 in 1911, and is zero for marriages that 
occurred before the war.  Panel B presents the stage 2 regressions, in which the dependent variable is the bride's class 
minus the groom's class for columns one and two, an indicator variable for the groom marrying a weakly higher class bride 
for the third and fourth columns, and an indicator variable for the bride being of low class (class 5, 6 or 7) for the 
last two columns.  The omitted category for female occupations is workers. Excess foreign males is defined as the 
percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign. Standard errors, given in 
parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable sex ratio. Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. 
 